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Abstract 
  
This thesis examines the use of Chinese resources for infrastructure contracts in Angola. China 
has engaged in this mechanism that trades African natural resources for Chinese infrastructure 
construction with several African countries. The main debate in the literature on Sino-African 
relations is between scholars who see China as a ‘neo-colonialist’ that reinforces a classic north-
south relationship of exploitation, and those who see China as a different development partner, 
emphasizing South-South cooperation and mutual benefit. The resources for infrastructure 
contracts have been used to construct the argument that China’s engagement in Africa is 
ultimately aimed at securing access to natural resources. To examine this assumption, I conducted 
a case study of Angola, the African country where the resources for infrastructure contracts has 
been most pronounced in scope and size. Due to challenges of data availability I complemented 
the secondary sources with primary sources from fieldwork conducted in Luanda, Angola. I also 
drew on evidence from comparable cases to shed light on the mechanism. I found that there are 
strong indicators suggesting that resources for infrastructure contracts are not mainly a 
mechanism to secure Chinese access to Angola’s natural resources. Rather, it seemed like a 
mechanism to mitigate the risks of extending a loan to a country with poor credit. However, this 
tentative finding is not automatically transferable to other cases as country-specific differences 
uncovered in the study shows the limitations in generalizing Sino-African relations from one 
case.   
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Chapter one - Introducing Sino-Angolan relations 
 
China, the biggest developing country in the world, is ready to join hands with Africa, the biggest 
developing continent in the world.         
 President of People’s Republic of China, Jiang Zemin 2006 1
My thesis is about Sino-Angolan trade relations, focusing on a mechanism that trades Angolan oil 
for Chinese infrastructure construction through a Chinese oil-backed export credit. In Angola, an 
export credit-line is extended by the Chinese export-import bank (Eximbank) to the Angolan 
government, and the credit is used to pay Chinese construction companies for projects after 
completion. The repayment is in oil. 
  
 
1.1 Introduction 
There are two main discourses on Sino-African relations. One group of scholars sees 
China as a ‘neo-colonialist’ that reinforces established north-south patterns of African resource 
extraction and elite relations. From that perspective it has been suggested that the resource for 
infrastructure credits is an instrument to secure access for China to Africa’s natural resources. 
Another group of scholars perceive China as a different development partner, emphasizing the 
mutual benefit of the Sino-African engagement. From this perspective it has been suggested that 
the benefits of obtaining infrastructure contracts may be even more important than the conceding 
of access to natural resources, and that the natural resources are merely used as a credit-guarantee 
for countries’ with poor credit. By using these diverging perspectives on Sino-African relations 
as a point of departure I wish to analyze the use of this mechanism in Angola from 2004 to 2010. 
My research question is:  
  
How has the Chinese resource for infrastructure mechanism developed since its implementation 
in Angola? Is this a mechanism to secure a steady supply of natural resources from Africa to 
China, or is it a mechanism to ensure mutual benefit?  
 
 
                                                          
1 Quoted in Alden et al. (2008:1) 
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1.2 Why study China in Africa?  
Accelerating relations between Africa and Asia in the last decade has not gone unnoticed in the 
media and in academic circles. Broadman suggests that South-South trade and investment 
relations are one of the most profound features of the new global economy. World trade had for 
decades been dominated by trade amongst the developed countries or between the north and the 
south. However, since 2000 there has been a massive increase in trade and investment flows 
between Asia and Africa (Broadman 2006:1-2). Several scholars suggest that China’s relations 
with Africa are at the core of this dynamic. Alden et al. suggest that “China’s expanding relations 
with Africa are the most important dynamic in the foreign relations and politics of the continent 
since the end of the Cold War (Alden et al. 2008:1).      
 China’s presence in the African continent however is not new as Chinese development aid 
to African countries started in the 1950s (Xinhuanet 2011:3). However, the size of the 
engagement and the attention it has received from the media, NGOs and academics is definitely 
new. This is to a degree due to the growth of the Chinese economy and the changing roles in the 
international economy. China is both an authoritarian state, and as of 2010, the world’s second 
largest economy. China has the world’s largest foreign reserve, surging over $2.85 trillion in 
2010, which makes China a significant player globally.2
 
1.3 Motivation and contribution 
Scholars suggest that social science research should be of value for both the real world, and for 
the academic discipline (Sckocpol 2003:409; King et al.1994:9). According to Brautigam (2009), 
myths and inaccuracies have surrounded the perception of the Chinese engagement in the media 
and NGOs alike. This was confirmed during my fieldwork as it was suggested to me by several 
informants in Angola that Chinese workers were indeed prisoners. This is a common myth about 
Chinese workers that no empirical evidence has supported so far (Brautigam 2010b). That makes 
more scholarly research important as a basis for the public debate. The field on ‘China in Africa’ 
is a young academic discipline. While material on the subject has been published has been 
published earlier, academic attention took off in 2006 (Large 2008:45). Several scholars in the 
Concerns have been raised by media and 
scholars alike of what the consequences of China’s increasing engagement with the continent will 
be. 
                                                          
2 The Economist (2011a). All dollars referred to in the thesis are US dollars. 
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field have called for more case studies, and more systematized information of Sino-African 
engagement (Mohan and Power 2008, Vines et al. 2009:vii). I hope to contribute to the scholarly 
debate by adding a case study of Sino-Angolan trade relations that is updated by 2011 and 
includes recent developments.  
 
1.4 The history of Sino-African relations 
1.4.1 1949-1978: Ideology 
Chinese influence in the period from 1949 to 1978 was characterized by Cold War politics and 
ideology. Beijing had little international support, and its relations were strained with both 
Moscow and Washington. Africa represented a new potential for building international relations, 
but were initially also viewed as a place to promote Maoism. Africa experienced de-colonization 
and liberation movements, and China first met with African liberation leaders at the Bandung-
conference in Singapore in 1955 (Tjønneland et al. 2006:6). The conference intended to advance 
Afro-Asian cooperation as a counterbalance to imperialistic nations such as the USA and the 
Soviet Union. Anshan writes that in the period from 1956 to 1978, China gave away billions of 
dollars in aid to Africa despite its own uncertain economy. During this period, China also 
supported several liberation movements and was quick to establish diplomatic relations with new 
independent African states (Anshan 2007:70-74) According to Alden, diplomatic objectives such 
as support against Taiwan and US dominance were important factors motivating the Chinese 
involvement. The tendency of African countries to vote as a block in agencies such as the UN 
combined with their numerical advantage made them diplomatically important to Chinese 
diplomacy (Alden 2007:22). The support to African states paid off as Beijing replaced Taipei in 
the Security Council in 1971, largely due to the support from African governments. In this period 
Alden argue that natural resources was not a motive for China’s involvement; rather, it was 
driven by a combination of geopolitical realities and the wish to “pursue prestigious aid work” 
(Alden et al. 2008:5).  
1.4.2 1978 -now: Economic co-development 
After 1978, Deng Xiaoping’s program for economic modernization influenced China’s foreign 
policy. “Mutual benefit” and “win-win cooperation” became key words in the relationship 
between China and African states (Hellstrom 2009:8). Brautigam emphasizes that China’s 
involvement in Africa after Mao’s death was shaped primarily by two influences. First of all, it 
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was shaped by China’s own experience of receiving aid and foreign investment. On this 
background, the Chinese government realized how aid and economic assistance could serve its 
own development goals. Second, the success of the state-sponsored engagement characteristic of 
the East Asian developmental state also influenced China (Brautigam 2009:18).    
 From the 1990s, China’s need for natural resources is often referred to as the main reason 
why China is involved in Africa. China shifted from being a net exporter of oil to a net importer 
of oil in 1993. The country is today the world’s second largest importer of oil, and its rapid 
growth during the two last decades has fueled its need for more natural resources (Alden 
2005:148). However, the debate has been broadened, and several scholars suggest that the focus 
on natural resources in Sino-African studies limits the development of academic progress in the 
Sino-African field (Brautigam 2009; Taylor 2007).       
 Africa’s international support continued to be of importance in an international 
environment that especially after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 condemned China. 
While Tiananmen alienated China from the West, several African leaders were supportive. 
“African elites, who themselves regarded democratization projects as potential threats, wanted to 
show China Third World solidarity and to express their resentment towards Western interference 
in the affairs of a fellow developing country” (Hellstrom 2009:8). China has received support 
from African countries on a range of issues: “The 2008 Olympics, blocking UN resolutions 
condemning human rights abuse in China, securing China’s position in the WTO and multilateral 
trade” (Alden 2008:22). A consequence of the importance of the Taiwanese issue has according 
to Taylor in several instances led African governments to sell their allegiance to the highest 
bidder of the two, China or Taiwan. Some African countries have even used this dispute to gain 
increased aid. Senegal is an example of a country that switched for the third time in 1996 to gain 
a generous aid package, as had been the case in the previous shift of diplomatic relations between 
Taipei and Beijing (Taylor 2009:29). 
1.5 Non interference and mutual benefit 
Western influence in Africa during the last two decades has been guided by the IMF and the 
World Bank, institutions that are known to require economic and political reforms as 
prerequisites for granting of financial assistance (Brautigam 2009:169). The Chinese approach 
challenges the assumption that introduction of human rights, legal systems and democracy are 
necessary conditions to gain development aid and loans. By its own example, China also 
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challenges any assumption that democracy is a prerequisite for economic growth. China’s 
policies for trade and aid are stated in their five principles of peaceful coexistence, and eight 
principles of foreign aid (MOFCOM 2004, Xinhuanet 2011). China’s five principles of peaceful 
coexistence were adopted in 1995. These principles contain a policy that emphasizes non-
interference in internal affairs, the sovereignty of states, equality and mutual benefit. The eight 
principles of foreign aid (1964) also state the importance of non-interference. Principle two is: 
“respect for the sovereignty of recipient countries, no strings attached and no privilege required”. 
This is a clear stance against the Western approach were aid and loans have become dependent 
on interference in the internal affairs of the recipient countries. According to Vines et al.:“China 
provides a new model of cooperation, based on credit lines, economy and commerce, which 
contrasts with Western efforts of cooperation based on aid attached to conditionality” (Vines et 
al. 2009:56). The Chinese approach has even been labeled the ‘Beijing consensus’ as a contrast to 
the existing ‘Washington consensus’ (Ramo 2004). Historically, the Chinese government 
emphasizes the fact that they never colonized Africa, a burden many Western countries face 
(Alden 2007:19). Chinese foreign policy in Africa is thus according to the Chinese government 
embedded in non-interference and mutual benefit.  
 
1.6 Chinese actors in Africa 
As China expands its Africa policy, the picture of who the Chinese actors in Africa are becomes 
more complicated. Some scholars suggest that the Chinese government and Chinese companies, 
state-owned and private, share the same agenda and closely cooperate (Downs 2007:48). 
According to Lagerkvist, it is a common misperception that China operates as a unified actor that 
operates according to a grand plan from Beijing. Chinese companies, regions, cities and 
diplomats have their own potentially competing, interests and agendas (Lagerkvist 2009:123). It 
is problematic to assume that Chinese state-owned companies always act in accordance with 
Beijing’s intentions. Competition between Chinese companies may create situations where the 
Chinese government does not benefit from their behavior. For example, the Chinese government 
is a primary shareholder of Chinese National Oil Companies (NOCs), but the Chinese NOCs are 
increasingly in direct competition with each other for projects. This is a problem for the Chinese 
government because it ultimately lowers the rate of the return for the winner. “When CNPC and 
Sinopec competed against each other for a pipeline project in Sudan, Chinese diplomats and the 
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China International Contractors Association unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Sinopec, the 
company that entered the lower bid, to withdraw from the competition” (Downs 2007:50). 
 The Chinese government encourages Chinese national companies to become international 
companies. The Chinese ‘go out’ policy is intended to facilitate for Chinese companies to expand 
overseas, and was formally launched in 2001 (Alden et al. 2008:20). The policy encourages 
Chinese companies to invest and expand overseas by offering incentives to ‘go out’. The Chinese 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) is the ‘primary bureaucratic interface between China and the 
rest of the world’ concerning trade and investment (Ide-Jetro 2009). As trade is the area where we 
clearly see an accelerating Sino-African engagement, this ministry is obviously important in 
Sino-African relations. But just as important are the publicly owned policy banks that facilitate 
Chinese investments in Africa. There are three policy banks in China, and two of them operate in 
Africa and provides financing for Chinese companies that wish to do business in Africa. These 
are the Chinese Eximbank and the Chinese Development Bank (CDB). These policy banks are 
expected to be tools to execute government policy in contrast to other Chinese state-owned banks 
that are now asked to operate on commercial principles. The CDB does not give out aid, but 
provides non-concessional development finance. The CDB operates mainly in China, but has had 
a growing role in Africa that is expected to increase. It set up the China Africa Development fund 
in 2006, announced to be $5 billion to ‘encourage and support Chinese enterprises to invest in 
Africa’ (Brautigam 2009:116). The Chinese Eximbank is crucial in China’s dealings with Africa. 
It is primarily used to offer export credits to sellers and buyers to support the purchase of Chinese 
goods, and is one of the world’s largest export credit agencies (Foster et al. 2009:6). Both 
commercial credits and concessional loans extended by the Eximbank, or other Chinese state 
agencies are tied to the purchase of Chinese goods and services. Trade and aid are closely linked, 
and may be confusing as credits may be partly financed by aid, and given as a mixed credit that is 
part commercial loan, and part aid. The tying of financing to Chinese goods and services ensures 
according to the Chinese perspective that both parties gain from the arrangement.    
 Private Chinese investors, migrants and companies have also ventured into Africa in the 
search of new markets and opportunities. It is thus not one ‘China’ in Africa, but an array of 
different, often competing Chinese actors. My focus is on the resource-backed credit-lines 
extended by the state-owned Chinese Eximbank. However, the Chinese companies that gain from 
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this mechanism are both state-owned and private, and have their own agenda that is not 
necessarily the same agenda as the Chinese government has.  
1.7 Organization of thesis 
The thesis is organized in six chapters. In this chapter I have outlined my research question, and 
given a short overview of the history of Sino-African relations and important Chinese actors. In 
chapter two, which is the theoretical fundament of the thesis, I will present an overview of the 
Sino-African engagement today, and perspectives on Sino-African relations. These theoretical 
perspectives will be used as a basis for hypotheses that will be further explored in the empirical 
section. In chapter three I argue for why I chose Angola as a case, and discuss methodological 
challenges with using a case study to investigate a phenomenon. This will be done by comparing 
resources for infrastructure contracts in other African countries, and discussing how the case of 
Angola can shed light on the resource for infrastructure mechanism. In chapter four I will present 
Angola, and Sino-Angola relations. In this chapter I will discuss the mechanism of the resources 
for infrastructure credits in Angola, and the situation Angola was in when the contracts with the 
China were negotiated. In chapter five I will discuss two main hypotheses from the theoretical 
chapter directly related to the second part of the research question: Is this a mechanism to secure 
a steady supply of natural resources from Africa to China, or is it a mechanism to ensure mutual 
benefit? I will also use evidence from other comparable cases to compliment the analysis.  In 
chapter six I will discuss the findings from of the thesis and suggest topics for further research. 
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Chapter two - The theoretical fundament 
 
2. Sino-African relations 
In this section I seek to place Sino-Angolan trade relations in a broader theoretical perspective, 
emphasizing how the resource for infrastructure mechanism may be theorized. This will be the 
fundament for exploring how the resource for infrastructure mechanism in Angola has changed 
since its implementation in 2004, and to what extent this is a mechanism for China to secure 
access to African natural resources. Primarily I will present an overview of the Chinese 
engagement in Africa to examine what information the theoretical perspectives are based on. I 
will present different dimensions of this engagement; trade, aid, investment, migration and 
diplomacy.  Further I will present trends in the ‘China in Africa’ literature, and two perspectives 
that will be used to analyze Sino-Angolan relations; dependency and win-win, respectively. On 
the basis of these perspectives I will formulate hypotheses to be explored in the analysis. I will 
finish with a short discussion of how I can use these hypotheses to analyze the empirical 
evidence. 
2.1 Trade 
According to a Chinese white paper, trade between China and Africa grew from approximately 
$10 billion in 2000, to $114.81 billion in 2010.3
                                                          
3 News.xinhuanet.com (2010:1) 
 China is now next to the USA as Africa’s top 
trading partner. African exports to China consist mainly of oil and mineral products, while Africa 
imports value-added goods from clothing, footwear and plastic products to electronic appliances, 
machinery and transport equipment. The oil and mineral products make Africa an important 
trading partner for China, even though trade with Africa is a relatively small part of overall 
Chinese trade (between 3 and 4 percent of overall Chinese trade in the world). While trade is still 
comparatively small, it is on the rise. China imports around fifty percent of its domestic 
consumption of oil, and Africa supplies 30 percent of that import (Christensen 2010:3). Chinese 
imports from Africa are highly geographically concentrated; Angola (32%), South Africa (23%) 
and Sudan (10%) accounted for about two-thirds of Chinese imports from the continent in 2009. 
Chinese exports to Africa is on the other hand quite diverse in terms of destination and is directed 
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at countries with large populations and /or large GDP per capita such as North Africa, Nigeria 
and South Africa (Haugen 2011:162-3). 
2.2 Resource for infrastructure/Angola mode 
Resource for infrastructure contracts, also known as the ‘Angola mode’ is a mechanism that 
trades natural resources for infrastructure construction. These contracts are referred to by the 
World Bank as ‘Angola mode’ because Angola was the first African country to sign a large 
resource for infrastructure contract with China (Alden and Alves 2009:13). The natural resource 
can be used as a security to guarantee repayment, or be conditional on preferential access to a 
natural resource for a Chinese company. The loan is provided by the Chinese Eximbank, and is 
contingent on the use of Chinese goods and services for the project(s) (Brautigam 2010a:15). The 
money is held in an escrow account in China, and the companies are reimbursed when projects 
are completed. Resources have been used to secure credit before, and especially in the oil 
industry. What is unique with these loans is that they are tied to infrastructure construction 
(Brautigam 2009:275). China has resource for infrastructure deals in several African countries, 
and more such deals are under negotiation. Oil isn’t the only natural resource that has been used 
to secure such credits. Other less demanded commodities are also used in such deals, such as 
cocoa in Ghana. The other resource for infrastructure credits will be further discussed in chapter 
three. 
 
2.3 Aid 
Africa is the largest recipient of Chinese development aid. While concrete numbers are labeled 
state secrets, China’s state council released its first official report on foreign aid in 2011.  It 
reports that 45.7 percent of Chinese development aid goes to Africa; 12.7 percent goes to Latin-
American/the Caribbean and 32.8 percent goes to Asia4. Countrywide breakdowns are not 
provided, but Chinese development aid goes to every African country that recognizes the ‘One 
China Policy’.5
                                                          
4 News.xinhuanet.com (2011) 
 China does not use the same definitions of Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) as the OECD does, and due to divergent opinions of what development aid consists of, it 
is difficult to compare the size of the Chinese development aid with other established donors. 
However, Brautigam estimated Chinese development aid to Africa to be $1.4 billion in 2008 by 
5 The ‘One China policy’ recognizes China, and not Taiwan as the legitimate Chinese state. 
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using Chinese sources and the OECDs Development Assistance Committee reporting categories 
(Brautigam 2010a:22). Chinese development aid has often been used to build ‘statement’ 
buildings such as stadiums. Chinese financing and export credits are often misunderstood to be 
Chinese development aid: “China’s official finance in Africa consists of grants, zero-interest 
loans, debt relief, and concessional loans (which would all qualify as ODA) as well as 
preferential export credits, market-rate export buyers’ credits, and commercial loans from 
Chinese banks, none of which would qualify as ODA” (Brautigam forthcoming (a):3). Chinese 
development assistance is characterized by non-conditional bilateral aid, delivered on a project 
basis, and closely linked with Chinese investment and trade interests (Tjønneland et al. 2006:8). 
While China has aid programs in education, health and agriculture, the main focus has been on 
the building of physical infrastructure tied to Chinese goods and services. The Chinese are happy 
to build statement buildings such as stadiums or government buildings that the ‘traditional 
donors’ are reluctant to support. The Chinese Eximbank is the only Chinese agency providing 
concessional loans to African countries, underscoring the connection between trade and aid in the 
Chinese engagement with Africa. 
2.4 Investment: Foreign Direct Investment and Special Economic Zones 
According to Alden et al. (2008), natural resource rich countries are main destinations of Chinese 
FDI, and 50-80 percent of FDI goes to Angola, Sudan, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and 
South Africa (Alden et al. 2008:14). According to Berthelemy, official Chinese FDI statistics are 
flawed and a big problem with measuring it is that a lot of Chinese foreign investment is pooled 
through offshore financial investment centers like Hong Kong or the Virgin Islands, and are thus 
not part of the official statistics (Berthelemy 2011:10). What types of investments are made? Do 
these go beyond natural resources and infrastructure construction sectors? We do see some 
evidence that natural resources and infrastructure are not the only sectors that receive Chinese 
investment. The biggest Chinese investment to date has been the Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China (ICBC) acquisition of a 20 percent stake in South African Standard Bank (Brautigam 
2009:279). Even though a lot of investment is directed to countries rich in natural resources, it 
does not necessarily mean that the investments are used to secure access to or control over natural 
resources.            
 A Special Economic Zone (SEZ) has more liberal economic laws than the rest of the 
country, and is a place where it is possible to experiment with different economic approaches 
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without changing the policies at a national level. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce stated that 
SEZ would be a key element of the Chinese “going global” policy, and in 2006 it announced a 
goal of establishing at least 50 such zones overseas.  The key difference between these and other 
SEZ was that they were to be “built and operated by Chinese Enterprises as profitable ventures” 
(Brautigam 2009:97-98). A tender was held by China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), and 
Chinese companies proposed projects in countries they chose. The winners of the tender would 
receive government support such as grants and long-term loans through special funds. So far, 19 
SEZ have been approved worldwide, and six of them are situated in Africa.6 To date, these are in 
the beginning phase in Africa. The zones are situated in Zambia, Egypt, Nigeria, Ethiopia, 
Mauritius and Algeria. The zones in Zambia and Egypt are under construction and in operation, 
while the others are still under construction except for the zone in Algeria that is suspended. One 
zone is focused on mineral processing, while the others are mainly concerned with manufacturing 
(Brautigam and Xiaoyang 2011:31-32).        
 Alves writes that:” the bulk of ETCZ7
2.5 Migration 
s to date has been targeted at the continent’s 
resource-rich countries and the largest markets” (Alves 2011:3). However, an exception to that 
rule is the SEZ in Mauritius, questioning the pattern of targeting natural resource rich countries. 
Brautigam and Xiaoyang emphasize that the zones are located in African countries that score 
high on ‘ease of doing business’. The SEZ are potentially a very important component of China’s 
Africa policy. However, it is still too early to know how these zones will develop, and what role 
they will play in China’s Africa policy in the future.  
Chinese migration to Africa is to some degree facilitated by Chinese companies operating there. 
Chinese workers often come to Africa on two or three year contracts; they live on the site and are 
often separated from the local community. However, many Chinese entrepreneurs migrate to 
Africa on their own in search of new opportunities. We thus find Chinese migrants in both the 
formal and the informal economy. The existence of Chinese migrants in the informal economy is 
especially interesting as these are jobs that Africans rarely have faced any competition from 
outside the continent in previously. The influx of Chinese migrants is very visible in African 
                                                          
6 In addition there are a handful of industrial zones that Chinese enterprises have set up outside the official 
MOFCOM program (Brautigam and Xiaoyang 2011:28). 
7 Alves refer to SEZ as ETCZ, but the differences are only in name. 
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countries. In Zambia, the opposition party even used anti-Chinese sentiments in its political 
campaign (Gadzala 2010). There are no clear numbers on the total amount of Chinese migrants to 
Africa, but according to Mohan and Tan-Mullins guesstimate range from 270 000 to 750 000 
(Mohan and Tan-Mullins 2009:590).  A recent study suggests that few Chinese stay in Africa for 
more than two or three years except for the ones that have settled in South Africa. While the 
Chinese workers are not highly paid compared to Western workers, they earn enough to buy their 
own house during a three year contract in Africa. Had they stayed in China, it would have taken 
them ten years to earn that amount (Jung Park 2009). However, it is still too early to say what 
will happen with the Chinese migrants in Africa. We don’t know if they will stay, how and if 
they will integrate with the local community, or if Chinese entrepreneurs will cooperate with 
local industries in the future.  
2.6 Diplomacy and political integration 
There is close political contact between China and African states. Chinese leaders often visit 
Africa, touring several African countries. African leaders are also often invited to Beijing. This 
stands in sharp contrast to Western leaders who seldom bother to visit Africa. The Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was arranged for the first time in 2000, and is held every 
three years. It is the official forum between China and African states, initiated by the Chinese 
government (Alden et al. 2008:2). This forum, in addition to regular diplomatic visits by leading 
Chinese government representatives shows that China sees African countries as important 
partners.  
2.7 China in Africa: state of the field 
According to Taylor (2007), there was a good amount of academic research in the early seventies 
on China in Africa. However: “Compared to other area studies on Chinese foreign policy, the 
field of Sino-African relations had been almost completely neglected, certainly from the 1980s 
onwards and continued to be as the 1990s progressed” (Taylor 2007:380).  Several scholars agree 
that the topic of China in Africa has been an ‘under-researched’ area (Large 2008; Alden et al. 
2008). This changed when China’s engagement in Africa accelerated. In 2006, announced as 
China’s ‘Year of Africa’ attention by media and academics was ‘cascading’(Large 2008:45).  
Earlier, even in the Maoist period, China’s presence in Africa was largely mulled over by 
specialists; now it has become a major world issue, a burning question about which over thirty 
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international conferences were held in 2006 alone, on which every self-respecting columnist finds 
it necessary to express an opinion (Snow 2008:xvi) 
Kopinski et al. (2011) suggest that the main debate in the literature has been between two 
discourses. The first discourse, that also reflects the official Chinese view, argues that the mutual 
benefit approach of China will ‘prove to be beneficial for the long-exploited African people’. On 
the other hand it is argued that China is no different from other external actors that cultivate 
relations with Africa, and that China gains significantly more from the relationship than Africa 
does (Kopinski et al. 2011:131). I will use these perspectives as a point of departure to discuss 
theoretical approaches to my case.  
2.8 Dependency and north-south exploitation  
There is nothing new about ‘the looting of Africa’8
The Chinese government emphasizes the mutual benefit and shared colonial experience of China 
and Africa, portraying China as a different development partner (Alden and Large 2011). 
However, some scholars suggest that this “unique” relationship only replicates patterns 
established by previous (Western) partners on the continent (Brautigam 2008; Alden and Alves 
2009). This pattern: “emphasises local elites, is founded on resource-backed loans and subscribes 
to a clear profit motive” (Alves and Alden 2009:21). On this background, it is argued that the 
reorientation towards Asia has done nothing to change established trade patterns, nor 
development relations. African governments are portrayed as passive players that have little 
leverage when negotiating with the Chinese dominant partner.     
 The literature identifies several pitfalls with an economy that is dominated by natural 
resource export. The resource curse suggests that countries that lack well-developed institutions 
may experience negative consequences of the availability of an abundant natural resource 
(especially oil and diamonds). According to Obi: “The implications of this diagnosis are that even 
if Africa experiences an increased net inflow of oil revenue from the oil revenue from the new 
boom, the oil curse and the rentier effect will conspire to ensure that it feeds into corruption and 
violent conflict rather than the development of society”(Cheru and Obi 2010:199).  
 As Tjønneland et al. write: “Trade statistics tell us that the traditional trade pattern 
 
                                                          
8 Cheru and Obi 2010:198 
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between Africa and the world will be reinforced by the Chinese. Africa’s role as an exporter of 
raw materials will be reinforced and it will be more challenging to diversify away from 
traditional exports. There is also decreasing scope for Africa to compete with China in labour-
intensive manufacturing – in Africa and in third markets.” (Tjønneland et al. 2006: viii). Cheap 
Chinese goods have already pushed domestic goods out of the African market in several 
countries (Taylor 2009:21). However, the cheap domestic goods from China may also have 
increased the purchasing power of locals in Africa. According to this perspective, Sino-African 
trade reinforces a classic north-south relationship.       
 This point of view stands in stark contrast to China’s official Africa policy. In this 
perspective, China’s search for natural resources is seen as the main reason for China’s presence 
in Africa, and in that process, old patterns are reinforced.  Sino-African trade has according to 
Alden commonly been analyzed through a ‘resource security’ perspective (Alden 2011). Some 
studies of China in Africa has been focused energy security9
                                                          
9 According to Yergins, the aim of energy security is: “to assure adequate, reliable supplies of energy at reasonable 
prices and in ways that do not jeopardize major national values and objectives” (Yergins 2006). 
, and has mainly analyzed Sino-
African relations with regard to China’s need to establish structures to secure long-term import of 
oil (Downs 2004; Soares de Oliveira 2008). The term ‘Resource security’ has been used to 
include other sectors of the extractive industry. Alden and Alves write that: “In addition to oil and 
in order to sustain its economic growth, China also became externally dependent on other sectors 
of the extractive industry further justifying its growing economic interaction with Africa” (Alden 
and Alves 2009:5). Kopinski et al. suggest that:”Resource security is undoubtedly the biggest 
driving force behind China’s increased involvement in Africa”. Several scholars thus ascribe the 
access to Africa’s natural resources as the main motivation behind China’s accelerated presence 
in the region (Alden and Alves 2009:5). According to Downs, China’s main energy security 
problem is the growing oil deficit (Downs 2004:23). Soares de Oliveira suggests that China is 
engaging in a number of policies to cope with its volatile energy supply. He emphasizes that the 
dimension that is most relevant for China-Africa relations is “a concerted effort by Chinese 
NOCs to venture into foreign markets and acquire equity oil” (Soares de Oliveira 2008:89). It is 
on the basis of this perspective that resource for infrastructure contracts in Angola are often 
analyzed as a facilitator for Chinese NOCs to gain equity oil (Alves 2010).    
  The resources for infrastructure deals are also viewed by some scholars as a 
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method to secure China a broad range of natural resources, from oil to minerals. Alden and Alves 
suggest that: “To gain access to these minerals, China has loaned billions of dollars to African 
countries for infrastructure development in exchange for resources” (Alden and Alves 2009:3). 
Further, the use of Chinese construction firms in the resource for infrastructure contracts is 
perceived by Alden and Alves as risk management: 
The use of familiar Chinese firms and labour to fulfil the terms of Chinese-financed 
infrastructure packages minimises exposure to risk and negative factors in the African 
environment that put off other investors, such as local corruption and labour costs (Alden and 
Alves 2009:10) 
In this perspective, the resources for infrastructure loans are attributed to China’s search for 
energy security/resource security alone. The use of Chinese firms and labor in the infrastructure 
projects is ascribed to minimizing risks, rather than being a goal in itself, or as a means to 
minimize corruption and or secure quality.  
2.9 South-south cooperation and mutual benefit 
China has emphasized mutual benefit since it first started giving aid to African states in the 
1950s. According to the FOCAC website, FOCAC is built on pragmatic cooperation, equality 
and mutual benefit. Hon et al. write that: “FOCAC provides the foundation for building a long 
term win-win China-Africa relationship. Through the FOCAC process China has cancelled 
African debt, facilitated expanded market access and provided a wide range of new opportunities 
for positive engagement” (Hon et al. 2010:4-5).       
 The first FOCAC was held in Beijing and was attended by close to eighty ministers from 
forty-four African countries (Taylor 2009:16). The third FOCAC held in 2006 coincided with the 
Chinese ‘year of Africa’, and was upgraded from the Ministerial level to level of heads of state 
for that year. China also presented the first official paper outlining its Africa policy (Tull 
2008:115).           
 Eight proposals were put forward to ‘forge a new type of China-Africa strategic 
partnership’ at the 2006 FOCAC by the Chinese president Hu. These commitments ranged from 
promises of more financing and debt cancellation, training African professional and students, 
building important infrastructure, establishing Special Economic Zones and opening up China’s 
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market to African exports. Included in the list was also the China-Africa development fund, 
valued at US$5 billion that would be established to encourage Chinese companies to invest in 
Africa. The inclusion of the fund in the list shows that the Chinese government suggests that the 
promotion of Chinese companies in Africa will benefit African countries. A Chinese white paper 
on China-Africa cooperation identifies the lack of infrastructure as a bottleneck for African 
countries: “As backward infrastructure is the bottleneck that hinders the development of many 
African countries, infrastructure construction is one important aspect of China-Africa economic 
and trade cooperation.”(Xinhuanet 2010) Chinese financial instruments such as export credits and 
concessional loans combined with Chinese companies are presented as the Chinese strategy of 
helping African countries overcome the ‘infrastructure bottleneck’.     
 This ambitious list underscores China’s formal commitment to engaging in a broad range 
of cooperation with Africa. However, it is suggested that while FOCAC sets the official agenda, 
negotiations and deals between African states and China are usually done on a bilateral basis. 
According to Hon et al., their research suggest:  “that the FOCAC ministerial meetings largely 
are formalities, setting the tone for future collaborative agreements. As a result de facto 
development of African countries’ relations with China takes place in the ongoing bilateral 
dialogue and the preparatory meetings that are coordinated in each African country by the 
President’s office and the Ministry of foreign affairs” (Hon et al. 2010:16). According to 
representatives from the Chinese MOFCOM, all commitments from the 2006 FOCAC have been 
implemented. The commitments announced at FOCAC can be a point of departure to assess the 
Chinese engagement in Angola in practice. From this approach we can assume that China is 
engaged in a range of activities in Africa in line with the FOCAC commitments that transcends 
natural resource extraction.         
 What place then does resource for infrastructure contracts have in China’s Africa policy? 
According to Brautigam, resources for infrastructure contracts epitomize China’s win-win Africa 
policy: “Although they are relatively rare, the large, complicated infrastructure-resource loans 
epitomize what the Chinese talk about when they talk about win-win”(Brautigam 2010a). She 
argues that the resource for infrastructure mechanism could translate resources into development 
projects, by bypassing opportunities for embezzlement and fraud. 
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The Chinese deal was not without risks, but it was also revolutionary for the country: for the first 
time, there was hope that some of Angola’s riches might actually be translated directly into 
development (Brautigam 2009:276). 
The resource for infrastructure mechanism is thus a perfect example to examine closer how the 
Chinese win-win approach plays out in practice. Brautigam suggests that the resource for 
infrastructure loans were inspired by China’s own experience with development. According to 
Brautigam, China in the seventies was an “agrarian economy with immense reserves of natural 
resources – oil, coal, gold, copper – similar in structure to many African countries today”. As 
Japan sought to diversify its energy suppliers, negotiations began between the two countries: “By 
the end of 1978, Chinese officials had signed seventy-four contracts with Japan to finance turn-
key projects that would form the backbone of China’s modernization. All would be repaid in oil.” 
This was, according to Brautigam, a model where Japan used resource-backed concessional loans 
to counter the fact that their equipment was far below Western standards. The Chinese found 
themselves in a similar position decades later: “More than two decades later, as China faced the 
dual challenges of promoting its own, often lower-quality, equipment exports, and securing 
access to needed raw materials, Chinese officials drew on this early experience with Japan. It 
shaped Chinese perceptions of how relations between two countries at different levels of 
development might be beneficial to both” (Brautigam 2009:46-47).    
 It is argued that the natural resource is used as a guarantee for the credit, rather than as a 
goal by itself.  Brautigam emphasizes that resource-backed credit is used for countries with poor 
credit ratings. She argues that the Chinese Eximbank does not require a resource-backing in 
countries with ‘good governance’. She emphasizes that for creditworthy countries with good 
economic environments and low risks, the Eximbank can issue loans directly to the government 
(Brautigam 2009). Seen in a win-win perspective, the resource-backing is a method to help 
African governments obtain Chinese credits that can result in necessary infrastructure 
construction, removing bottlenecks for African countries.      
 Brautigam suggests that exports and contracts for infrastructure are hugely important for 
the Chinese; in 2008, the Chinese exported equipment worth more than $50 billion, Chinese 
construction companies earned revenues of $20 billion, and signed contracts worth $39.6 billion 
in Africa. The Chinese ‘Go Global’ policy facilitates Chinese companies’ establishment oversea 
through various incentives such as credits from the Eximbank.  
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2.10 Hypotheses based on the two perspectives 
Based on these two perspectives I wish to take the discussion further by formulating two main 
hypotheses grounded in the literature. H1 is based on the assumption that Chinese activities in 
Africa are aimed at securing access to natural resources and that in that process, classic north-
south exploitation patterns are reinforced.  
H1: The ‘Angola mode’ is a mechanism to secure Chinese access to oil and other natural 
resources  
This hypothesis implies that the resources for infrastructure contracts are used to facilitate the 
entrance of Chinese NOCs to acquire oil equity, or for China to achieve a steady supply of oil. 
We can also identify underlying assumptions to this hypothesis: that the Chinese construction 
companies are used to mitigate risk, and that the African governments’ are just passive players in 
China’s search for natural resources.         
 What empirical evidence would we expect to find in Angola according to H1?  If this 
mechanism secures oil supply to China we would expect to find that Chinese NOCs have had 
substantial advantages in acquiring oil equity/entering the Angolan market because of the 
resource for infrastructure contracts. We would also expect that these credits have facilitated a 
long-term oil supply to China. We would find that the Chinese companies with workers from 
China are used primarily to mitigate risks. If they are used primarily to mitigate risk we would 
expect to see little economic gain for these companies. We would also expect them to leave after 
the official infrastructure projects were finished. Companies would be state owned, and mainly 
Chinese workers would be employed. The Angolan government would behave as passive players 
in a classic north-south relationship.         
 H2 is based on the assumption that the resources for infrastructure contracts epitomize 
China’s win-win Africa policy where both countries gain from the engagement. Oil is used to 
mitigate the risk of extending credit so that the country is able to benefit from China’s credit and 
construction companies.  
H2: The resource for infrastructure contracts is a mechanism to secure contracts for Chinese 
companies and infrastructure development for Angola  
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There are some underlying assumptions to this hypothesis. First of all, the natural resource is 
used to mitigate the risk of extending a credit to a country with poor credit ratings. Second, both 
China and Angola gains from the arrangement.       
 If this mechanism is used to facilitate the entrance of Chinese companies, we would 
expect to see that Chinese companies are established in Angola because of this credit.  We would 
also find indications that the oil is used to mitigate the risk of extending credit to a country with 
poor credit ratings. In addition, both China and Angola would have achieved substantial gains 
through participating in this arrangement. Angola would have gained much needed infrastructure 
construction while China would gain contracts for Chinese companies.    
 The first part of the resource question relates to how this mechanism may have developed 
since it was first implemented in 2004. This discussion is essential to clarify what mechanism we 
are discussing, and how this has developed. In this process I will assess changes internally in 
Angola to get an understanding of the circumstances that are essential to discuss the second part 
of my research question. The two hypotheses will be explored through China’s oil gains, 
including the acquisition of oil equity by Chinese NOCs in Angola, and China’s supply. I will 
also assess Angola’s infrastructure gains from this agreement and the gains for Chinese 
construction companies through this mechanism. As the aim is to explore rather than to falsify 
the hypothesis I have not identified a threshold for when a hypothesis is falsified or confirmed. 
However, I will look for indicators supporting the different hypotheses, and use that as a base for 
tentative conclusions. I will also explore the usability of the theoretical perspectives to analyze 
the case.             
 In this chapter I have first presented an overview of Sino-African relations. This was done 
to have a point of departure to discuss theoretical perspectives in the Sino-African context. 
Further I discussed two different theoretical perspectives, and formulated hypothesis to be 
explored in the Angolan context.  
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Chapter three - Choosing Angola: The methodological fundament  
 
3. Introduction 
In this chapter I will discuss why Angola is a good case to analyze whether the resources for 
infrastructure contracts are a mechanism used by China to access African natural resources, or a 
mechanism to ensure mutual benefit. I will also argue for drawing on indicators from comparable 
cases in the analysis. Thereafter I will discuss the case study as a method, and the use of it in the 
field of comparative politics. I will finish with a discussion of data availability, fieldwork and the 
use of semi-structured interviews. 
 
3.1 Why Angola? 
“China needs natural resources and Angola wants development” 
Angolan President dos Santos 200610
 
 
Table 1: Chinese resources for infrastructure deals in Africa11
 
 
                                                          
10 Quoted in Vines and Campos 2010:193 
11 Based on Foster et al. 2009 and updated with Brautigam 2010a 
Country Year of 
commitment 
Natural 
resource 
Project description Amount Status 2011 
Congo-
Brazzaville 
2001 Oil  Imboulou hydro-
electric dam. Backed 
by crude oil guarantees 
280 
million 
Completed 
Sudan  2001 Oil  El-Gaili Power Plant. 
Oil used as collateral 
128 
million 
Completed 
Angola 2004, 2007, 
2010 
Oil  A range of 
infrastructure projects. 
Repaid with crude 
oil/revenue from oil 
10 billion Some 
completed, 
some under 
construction 
Nigeria 2005 Oil Infrastructure in 
exchange for oil equity 
2 billion Cancelled 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
2006 Bauxite Souapiti Dam project. 
Allegedly linked to 
mining revenues. 
1 billion Cancelled 
 
Ghana 2006 Cocoa Bui Dam. Repaid with 
cocoa exports to China  
562 
million 
Under 
construction 
Congo-
Kinshasa 
2007 Copper Mining and 
reconstruction 
3 billion Under 
construction 
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In addition to these projects, there are discussions of resource for infrastructure contracts in 
several other African countries such as Zimbabwe, Chad and Niger12
These credits backed by natural resources are a small and possibly increasing part of the total 
lending activity of the Chinese Eximbank in Africa. In comparison, the Chinese Eximbank has 
financed more than 300 projects in Africa since 1996 (Brautigam 2010a:16). We see that in 
Congo-Brazzaville and the Sudan, oil was used as guarantees rather than to repay the credit 
directly. In Angola, the credit is possibly repaid with crude oil shipped to Chinese refineries, and 
thus directly used to repay the used credit. The details of the Angolan agreement will be 
discussed further in chapter four. In Nigeria, the credit was linked with oil equity acquisition by 
Chinese NOCs. However, the deal in Nigeria fell through, and there are no immediate plans for a 
similar structure there for now. The project in Equatorial Guinea has also been cancelled, but 
there are negotiations between a group of private Chinese investors and Equatorial Guinea on a 
new resource for infrastructure contract, so it may seem like China is still officially involved even 
though the Chinese Eximbank has no resource for infrastructure engagement there. In Ghana the 
credit is paid back through cocoa beans export, allegedly 40,000 mt of coca beans annually over 
20 years. The loan repayment would absorb approximately six percent of Ghana’s cocoa 
production (Brautigam 2011).  When we have several examples of countries that have engaged in 
resources for infrastructure contracts, why would we use only Angola to scrutinize the resource 
for infrastructure contracts? 
.  
The research question aims to investigate whether this mechanism is used to secure access 
for China to Africa’s natural resources. If this is the case, then it is natural to ask what natural 
resource is most important for China. China went from being an oil exporter to a net importer of 
oil in 1993. China imports around fifty percent of its domestic consumption of oil, and oil is 
China’s largest external reliance (Christensen 2010). As mentioned in Chapter two, Chinese 
imports from sub-Saharan Africa have been highly concentrated in a few countries that, with the 
exception of South Africa, are oil-producing countries (Broadman 2008). The importance of oil is 
clearly seen when one takes a closer look at the composition of the Chinese imports from sub-
Saharan Africa. In 2006, three quarters of China’s imports from sub-Saharan Africa consisted of 
oil. Four countries accounted for 93 percent of China’s oil supply from sub-Saharan Africa: 
                                                          
12 Interview with Deborah Brautigam, Researcher at American University in Washington, 13/5 2011 
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Angola (51%), Sudan (18%), Congo-Brazzaville (13%) and Equatorial Guinea (11%) (Foster et 
al. 2009).  
If this mechanism is not used to secure access of oil to China, then why use such a 
complicated mechanism to secure a steady supply of less strategically important copper from 
Congo-Kinshasa? Considering this, I argue that scrutinizing a country that uses oil in the resource 
for infrastructure contracts would be most fruitful to explore this assumption. As we can see from 
Table 1, of the countries that have used oil in the resource for infrastructure contracts, Angola 
stands out by the size, the fact that the credit is extended several times, and the amount of 
projects that were financed. In both Congo-Brazzaville and the Sudan, the credit was used to 
build a single large infrastructure project. In the case of Nigeria, the whole agreement was 
cancelled.   
Sino-Angolan relations have expanded quickly. In 1999, China imported 40 000 barrels of 
oil per day (bpd) from Angola, while in 2009 the oil import from Angola amounted to 800 000 
bpd (Minpet 2010). Broadman points out that while the content of exports and imports has 
remained the same, main trading partners have changed. Angola has during a short period of time 
replaced South Africa as the main trading partner in the region, and Sudan as the main oil 
supplier to China in the region (Alden and Alves 2009:7).       
  Due to the size and scope of the resource for infrastructure contracts in Angola, it 
is an example of an extreme case. An extreme case is characterized by extreme or unusual values 
on x1 or Y. Angola is not a representative case of Sino-African engagement. It is as China’s main 
trading partner in the continent, and the resources for infrastructure contracts have dominated 
Sino-Angolan relations. An extreme case is mainly used to generate hypotheses, and its 
representativeness is achievable only in comparison to a larger sample of cases (Gerring 2007). If 
we don’t find that this is a mechanism used to secure access to natural resources in Angola, then 
we would not expect it to be an instrument primarily used for that purpose in other countries 
either. However, as an extreme case, it is not possible to automatically use findings from Angola 
to generalize to other cases of Chinese resource for infrastructure engagement in Africa. While 
the main focus will be on Angola, I will also draw on examples from the other countries that have 
engaged in oil for infrastructure contracts such as Nigeria, the Sudan and Congo-Brazzaville in 
the analysis. This may shed light on comparable agreements, and uncover some country-specific 
differences. By drawing on evidence from comparable cases I also wish to explore the potential 
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for external validity of the findings from Angola. By analyzing Angola and drawing on examples 
from countries that have engaged in similar mechanisms I seek to add to theory building in the 
field of ‘China in Africa’.  
 
3.2 Why case study? 
According to Gerring what we should study is to some degree contingent on what we already 
know. The status of a field, i.e., the amount of case-studies or cross-case studies already 
conducted will tell us what type of studies the field is lacking. It is more fruitful to contribute 
with a case-study in a field that is dominated by cross-case comparison, and vice-versa (Gerring 
2007:62). In the field of “China in Africa” several scholars have called for less generalized 
overviews, and more in-depth study of Chinese influence in Africa to disentangle country 
specific variations (Mohan and Power 2008, Vines et al. 2009:vii). While there has been a rise of 
such case studies in recent years, Angola (alongside Sudan) is probably one of the countries in 
Africa that has received the most attention from scholars (Corkin 2008; Kiala 2010; Vines and 
Campos 2008, Ferreira 2008; Vines et al. 2009; Alves 2010).  This is probably due to the size of 
the Chinese engagement as Angola has been of the most visible example of Sino-African 
engagement the recent years. The lack of a comprehensive database and the potential problems of 
data reliability are strong arguments against using a quantitative study to analyze Sino-African 
relations (Brautigam 2009). What I want to add to the discourse with adding another case-study is 
a more thorough in-depth examination that covers the latest development of the engagement. 
However, the existing studies also allows for a better understanding of recent developments of 
Sino-Angolan relations as they lay the ground for further examination. I seek to identify some of 
the mechanisms of Sino-Angolan relations to compare with the broader generalizations of the 
Sino-African engagement. The case of Angola has been used to understand Sino-African 
relations in previous studies. Ovadia write that: “The Angolan case is most often selected due to 
the depth of Chinese engagement. It is particularly useful for wider generalizations in other cases 
where China is engaged in significant natural resource extraction” (Ovadia 2010:11). I wish to 
avoid ‘conceptual stretching’ as meanings associated with the resources for infrastructure mechanism in 
Angola (the model case) may fail to fit with additional cases (Sartori 1970). I argue that Sino-Angolan 
relations, as an extreme case of the resource for infrastructure mechanism is not automatically 
suitable for wider generalizations. Nevertheless, the Angolan case may contribute to a broader 
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understanding of other African countries that have operated with resource for infrastructure 
contracts, specifically when the resource is oil. Kopinski et al. cautions:“Not to generalize 
Beijing’s relationship with a handful of African states to reflect China’s ties with the entire 
African continent”(Kopinski et al. 2011:131). This I will avoid by ensuring strong internal 
validity, and prioritizing internal to external validity in my thesis.   
 
3.3 The use of case study in comparative politics 
Comparative politics is referred to as the study of political phenomenon that is compared through 
time and/or space. There are several methods used to conduct comparative studies such as most 
similar/most different systems. However, case studies also have a place in comparative politics. 
Gerring defines a case study as an “intensive study of a single unit or a small number of 
units (the cases), for the purpose of understanding a larger class of similar units” (Gerring 
2007:37). The use of case studies has been widely debated, and I will discuss the potential trade-
offs of using case-study in the next section. My thesis will use a comparative perspective that will 
implicitly compare my case with other cases (Collier 1991). My thesis is implicitly comparative 
by 1. Placing Angola in a pattern of Chinese engagement in Africa, and drawing on previous 
studies of Chinese engagement in other African countries. 2. It is also a comparison of the same 
unit over time- trying to explain whether and how the Chinese engagement in Angola has 
developed from 2004 to 2010. 3. I will also compare the resource for infrastructure mechanism in 
Angola with other African countries that have negotiated oil for infrastructure agreements with 
China. 
 
3.4 Potential trade-offs 
The use of case study as a method has just as other methods of inference some inherent potential 
trade-offs. Gerring identify eight main trade-offs between case studies and cross-case studies. I 
will relate these to the challenges with my own thesis (Gerring 2008:37-57). (1)The first trade-off 
is between generating hypothesis and testing hypothesis. My thesis is more concerned with 
generating hypotheses, and in the process not exclude what Ragin refers to as ‘casing’:“defining 
the topic, including the hypothesis(es) of primary interest, the outcome, and the set of cases that 
offer relevant information vis-a-vis the hypothesis” (Gerring 2007:40, Ragin 1997:127). I argue 
that such an approach is especially useful where there is a lack of a solid theoretical background 
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as in the recent field of “China in Africa”. 
(2) Is external or internal validity prioritized? Internal validity is crucial and prioritized over its 
ability to generalize. While I hope to shed light on other cases with my study, the main concern is 
ensuring the internal validity. This is especially important as myths and inaccuracies have been 
widespread in the perception of Chinese engagement in Africa. (3) Is insight in causal 
mechanisms or causal effects more valuable? Causal mechanisms are prioritized as it is early to 
draw conclusions on a recent development. However, that does not mean that it is not possible to 
look for causal effects, but the result will be tentative (4) Is the scope of the causal inference deep 
or broad? In the classic choice between knowing more about less or less about more the aim is to 
know more about less as there are already numerous studies that have focused on less about more 
in the field (Alden 2007; Taylor 2008; Brautigam 2009) (5) Is the population of cases under study 
heterogeneous or homogeneous? Sub-Saharan Africa is a heterogeneous region with large 
differences between some countries. Comparability is thus not obvious. Snow emphasize that: 
“the new Sino-African encounter doesn’t lend itself to easy generalization”(Snow 2008:xvii). 
While resources for infrastructure contracts are present in several African countries, negotiations 
are always bilateral and thus the final result will always have variations. The success of such 
contracts in Angola and not in Nigeria emphasizes the challenges of transferability (6) Is the 
causal relationship of interest strong or weak? The topic of interest is whether the causal 
relationship is weak or strong. Examining the potential strength of the causality is part of the aim. 
(7) Is useful variation on key parameters within that population rare or common? Examining the 
amount of useful variation is also something that will be done while exploring the case. (8) Is 
available data concentrated or dispersed? The data availability is very important for my decision 
to do fieldwork in Angola, and will be discussed in the next section. 
 
3.5 Data availability 
To find reliable secondary literature I started with informal conversations with academics with 
knowledge in the field. This is considered a time-saving and effective approach in the exploratory 
phase of research (Bogner et al. 2008).  Articles and books recommended by academics as well 
as published by recognized research institutions that focused on the field13
                                                          
13 Chatham house, South African Institute of International Affairs, Stellenbosch Centre for Chinese Studies and the 
World Bank 
 were natural starting 
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points. An initial challenge for everyone that wants to say something about the Chinese 
involvement in Africa is data availability. Some suggest that a language barrier is responsible for 
some of the perceived lack of data by Western scholars. Sources are often published in Chinese, 
or in the language of the receiving country such as Portuguese or French. It is also suggested that 
the Chinese version of government pages contain more information than the English version 
(Brautigam 2009; Hubbard 2008:218). Information is difficult to obtain as there are little 
comprehensive or complete numbers of them publicized. The most common take on the lack of 
comprehensive data is to triangulate the available sources. Available sources include international 
and Chinese media reports, government sites and company sites. Some scholars have supplied 
this information with interviews with representatives from China and African governments and 
companies. As a result of the different methods of triangulation used by different scholars, some 
studies operate with different numbers than others. A study that adds together all the Chinese 
financing reported by international media such as the US government report by Lum et al. 2009 
will inevitably find different numbers than the World Bank study by Foster et al. 2009 that only 
reported numbers verified by the Chinese government sites. Such studies are then sometimes 
challenged by researchers who have done country-specific fieldwork. In short, the landscape of 
Chinese financing can seem confusing, and challenging to systematize. The availability of 
information in Angola in general is also a challenge. The political landscape of Angola adds an 
additional layer to the access of relevant information (Orre 2010). This was underscored when I 
interviewed a World Bank employee about the Chinese credit-lines: 
We don’t know. We don’t get the information. We try as much as we can but the information is 
just not there. You might be able to get some information from me, but how do you certify it, how 
do you know that it’s true? That’s the thing because you go to the government and you just don’t 
get the information, it is just not there.14
Due to the aforementioned challenges regarding data availability both in the “China in Africa” 
field, and in Angola I argue the necessity of supplementing the secondary literature with 
fieldwork. My data will thus combine secondary sources such as academic publications and 
newspaper articles with primary sources such as government documents and interviews. This 
triangulation of primary and secondary sources brings inherent challenges. In case of 
 
                                                          
14 Interview with Ana Maria Carvalho, Communications and External Affairs at the World Bank,  27\1 2011 
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contradictory findings, what is regarded as more reliable? In such cases I will present the 
different information in my thesis, and discuss what sources are seen as most reliable on a case to 
case basis. 
 
3.6 Interview as a method 
In my fieldwork I used expert interviews (Bogner et al. 2009) to obtain information. According to 
Littig, the expert is defined by the researcher on the basis of the topic of research. Expert 
interviews are often confused with elite interviews, but differ by focusing on interpretive power 
rather than formative power. An informant is recognized as an expert due to his occupational or 
professional knowledge. This knowledge contributes to explicit or tacit interpretive knowledge, 
procedural knowledge and process knowledge. In other words, the know-why, know-how and 
processes of the topic of interest. The expert may typically have a lower hierarchical position 
than the economic and political elite. Insofar as the aim of the research is to obtain the know-
how, know-why and process knowledge, the interview is an expert interview even when 
interviewing the elite (Littig 2009:107-109). There are three types of expert interviews: the 
exploring, the systematizing and the theory generating. The exploring type is used in a relatively 
unknown field, the systematizing is used to reconstruct “objective” knowledge, while the theory-
generating type draw on not only knowledge, but also on the interpretive knowledge that the 
informant has obtained through professional practice (Littig 2009:101). I draw on both a 
systematizing and theory generating approach.  
I was looking for information on the Chinese credit-lines, and also other credit-lines extended to 
Angola from other countries to map out the Angolan economic situation which I will argue was 
an important factor concerning the resources for infrastructure contracts to be negotiated in the 
first place. While news reports had been published about other credit-lines and mentioned in 
some studies, no further information was available. To uncover what credits other external agents 
are offering the Angolan government is crucial when you wish to identify what separate the 
Chinese approach from the rest. However, terms of export-credits are usually not ‘particularly 
transparent’: 
“Even in the OECD countries, commercial bank loans and officially supported export credits are 
not particularly transparent. While the amount of loans and credits are usually reported, it has 
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long been common practice for export credit agencies to treat almost all other information about 
officially supported export buyers’ credits and official guarantees as confidential due to its 
commercial nature” (Brautigam forthcoming(a):12).  
 Interestingly, the Chinese credit-lines proved to be more transparent than credit-lines from other 
external actors, possibly due to all the attention the Chinese credit-lines have gotten in the local 
and international media (Croese 2011)  
 
3.7 Informants 
Initially I mapped out who I should talk to with informal conversations with academics in the 
field, both local and international, that had already conducted fieldwork in Angola. Further, I 
used the “snowball” method, asking informants about who they thought I should talk to regarding 
my topic.            
 In Angola there was a need for a formal letter of introduction to gain access to 
government representatives. That letter is to be handed in, for example at the Ministry of Finance, 
and then you have to wait for a reply. This took about a week. That by itself was an initial 
obstacle that required the cooperation of a recognized and preferably local institution. It is not 
surprising that the University of Bergen is not a well-known institution in Angola, and therefore I 
used the Catholic University of Luanda for accreditation. Informants outside the government did 
not require any official letter or formal pathway of contact and was much easier to get interviews 
with. However, getting in touch with potential informants was a time-consuming and tedious 
affair as only landlines were posted on web pages and nobody would pick up the phone for days 
till suddenly you would get a reply. The most successful way of getting interviews was obtaining 
someone’s mobile number from someone who knew them. Then there was no problem in getting 
an interview.            
 I conducted 8 taped interviews, and four untapped interviews in Luanda, Angola. I also 
conducted two untapped interviews with scholars in the field in Bergen, Norway. In addition I 
conducted several informal conversations with informants that were not taped, but that broadened 
my understanding of the topic. My informants consisted of  
1. Local and international academics. A “China in Africa” conference was arranged while I was 
in Luanda so I was able to have conversations with several leading scholars in the field. This also 
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brought me up to date on recent developments in the field, and I was able to get additional 
information that was not yet published.  
2. Government representatives from different embassies and the Angolan government. This was 
to obtain information on the other credit-lines to compare them with the Chinese credit-lines. 
 3. Non Governmental Organizations. To get the civil society impression of the Chinese 
engagement, focusing on whether they saw China as a different external actor.  
There were also potential informants I did not get the chance to interview. This is a weakness of 
the fieldwork. People who could have contributed to a fuller understanding are: Chinese 
government officials, private Chinese investors, more Angolans high up in Sonangol and the 
Angolan government. These were unfortunately difficult to get in touch with, and the ones I 
managed to get in touch with had little time to spare for interviews. 
The validity of the information obtained through interviews is an obvious source of error. 
Informants can have their own agenda and may have deliberately or not shared inaccurate 
information. In the case of Angola: “Authorities routinely limit the access of private media to 
official information” (HRW 2011:1). Obviously, this limits the access to correct information. 
 Some informants were happy to share numbers in discussion, but would not let me quote 
them as they were for “internal use”.15 Several of my sources, including local academics 
confirmed that it was often difficult to obtain information in Angola16
                                                          
15 Interview with source at the Angolan Ministry of Finance, 31/1 2011 
. That highlights the 
importance of previous research in the area to analyze the reliability of the information. 
Concerning triangulation of sources, there are some concerns when conducting fieldwork in a 
country like Angola. A driver that I used during the stay told me that he often drove foreign 
journalists and academics to interview the same people. There is thus a danger that some local 
individuals will bias the information by being among the selected few that researcher’s interview 
during field work. Triangulating secondary and primary sources based on interviews with the 
same group of people will not show the way to an enlightened image of the case. Repeating 
something does not necessarily make it true. However, keeping that in mind it is possible to 
analyze the available information.  
 
16 Interview with Regina Santos, Economist Economist at the Catholic University in Angola, 19/1 2011 
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3.8 Conducting interviews 
All interviews in Angola were conducted in Luanda during a period of three weeks. All my 
interviews were conducted in person, usually at the office of the informant. Interviews were 
semi-structured with open questions, and taped unless the informant objected to it. I used the 
same interview guide for all of the informants with slight modifications depending on the 
informant. There is an inherent quest for balance as the researcher has a dual duty: “to ensure the 
purpose of the scholarly investigation and a simultaneous duty to protect the research subject 
from harm” (Obelene 2009:185). To ensure that the informants were not negatively affected by 
participating in the study, all informants were informed of the purpose of the interview and 
offered anonymity. Informants were offered to confirm quotes that would be used, and while 
some informants saw that as a prerequisite, others did not care to do that. The interviews were 
mainly conducted in English with the exception of one that was conducted in Spanish. When the 
English proficiency was not ideal, correct words were identified through similar Spanish words. 
While Portuguese and Spanish share 80 percent of the vocabulary, it is by no means the same 
language. Because of this I have carefully screened interviews for such parts in the transcription 
process, and have contacted informants by mail if I have been in doubt of the meaning of 
word/context. As I had to take notes during some of the interviews that were not taped, this was 
especially important to avoid misunderstandings. Transcription is a prerequisite for analysis and I 
coded all of the interviews according to thematic categories. I based my coding on Aberbach and 
Rockman, separating between ‘manifest’ that involve direct responses, ‘latent’ that are responses 
that were not called upon directly by the questions, and ‘global’ where the coder is forming 
judgments from the interview of general traits and styles. Aberbach and Rochman suggest that on 
average, the ‘manifest’ items were most reliable, something I also experienced when I coded the 
interviews (Aberbach and Rockman 2002:675). Transcripts and tapes are stored and are available 
upon request.  
 
3.9 My role in the interviews 
Bogner and Menz argue that the interaction effects that are commonly treated as potential 
distortions in interviews should rather be viewed as elements that are essential in the process of 
data collection (Bogner and Menz 2009:45).Six different perceptions of the interviewer are 
identified. Co-expert, expert from a different knowledge culture, layperson, authority, potential 
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critic and accomplice. Abels and Behrens also emphasize the interaction effect of not only age, 
professional status, background experience and cultural factors but also of gender, especially in 
cultures where men dominate. They see it as a potential advantage that the female researcher is 
regarded as less intelligent and thus get more thorough and specific information (Abels and 
Behrens 2009:150). In my experience I did not obtain any advantages of being female, reinforced 
by the fact that several of my informants were women. One local academic said that it could be 
an advantage to be a foreigner to obtain interviews; however, it is difficult for me to verify 
whether it was easier without a relevant comparison17
 
. I was seen as a foreign student with some 
knowledge rather than as an expert. I experienced that the motivation for my research was 
questioned by Angolans who always wanted to know why I studied Angola before I conducted 
the interview. Vines et al. (2010) noted an increasing fatigue amongst Angolan officials of the 
fixation in the West about the Chinese involvement in Angola. I experienced this to some degree, 
and it was also suggested by a local academic that I should study something else about Angola 
than the Chinese engagement.         
  To sum up, in this chapter I have argued that Angola is a good case to challenge 
the assumption that the resource for infrastructure mechanism is used to secure Chinese access to 
African natural resources. Angola is selected due to the depth and size of Chinese engagement, 
and because the resource used is China’s largest external reliance, and therefore the most crucial 
commodity for China. I have further discussed the use of case-study, and data availability on the 
topic. Due to the challenges of data availability I have argued that the secondary literature had to 
be supplemented with primary sources. Last I discussed interview as a method, and my role in the 
interviews. In the next chapter I will draw on the hypotheses from chapter two, and use these to 
analyze the extreme case of Angola.  
 
 
 
                                                          
17 Interview with Regina Santos, Economist Economist at the Catholic University in Angola, 19/1 2011 
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Chapter four - It’s the oil, stupid! 
 
4. Introduction 
What situation was Angola in when the Chinese resources for infrastructure credit was first 
extended? I will first present a short overview of Angola, and the Sino-Angolan engagement. 
Further I will present the origins and history of oil-backed loans in Angola to contextualize the 
Chinese oil-backed credit.  Last, I will discuss how the resources for infrastructure mechanism 
functions in Angola. This is important both for the discussion of whether there have been any 
change since implementation, and not least what conditions were connected to the negotiations. 
Central to this discussion is whether oil equity was part of the resource for infrastructure 
negotiations. 
4.1 Angola: oil rich, but dirt-poor 
“It’s a small minority that is benefitting from the oil. Maybe ten percent, maybe only one percent 
is benefitting. The rest are not”          
   Former Angolan Finance minister18
There were three core competing groups fighting for Angola before and after independence in 
1975. The MPLA was mainly supported by the Soviet and Cubans, while the UNITA and the 
FNLA were mainly supported by the US and South Africa, but also at times by China.
 
19 The war 
came to a final end with the death of UNITA’s leader Joseph Savimbi in 2002, leaving the MPLA 
as the winners of the war. Angola is now formally an electoral democracy, and the MPLA last 
confirmed its position in the country with a landslide victory in the parliamentary elections of 
2008. However, it is difficult to separate the state apparatus from the MPLA, and poor ratings in 
the Freedom House Index confirm that Angola can hardly be classified as a functioning 
democracy. Angola is also rated at the lower end of the scale by the Human Development Index 
(146 of 169 countries ranked) and by the Corruption Perception Index (168 out of 178 countries 
ranked).20
                                                          
18 Quoted in presentation at Cristhian Michelsen Institute, Bergen by Jesse Ovadia 20/5 2010. Video of presentation 
available at CMI .no. 
 According to UN data there were approximately 18 million people in Angola in 2008 
and life expectancy at birth is estimated to be less than 50 years Nevertheless, estimates of 
19 FLEC also played a minor role in the civil war, mainly concerned with the independence of the Cabinda-region. 
20 2010 reports can be obtained from respectively freedomhouse.org, hdr.undp.org, transparency.org. 
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Angola’s population and life expectancy are, like other figures for the country, uncertain.21
                                                          
21 Data availability in Angola is discussed in chapter three. 
 
  Angola is estimated to have one of sub-Saharan Africa’s biggest oil reserves 
alongside Nigeria. Hodgens (2004) suggests that since independence, oil has had an exceptional 
significance in Angola, listing five examples of areas he claims have been affected by oil. The 
first and most obvious is the economy of Angola. Oil and oil related activities account for 85 
percent of GDP, and 90 percent of exports. Because of the dependence on one commodity, 
Angola is enormously volatile in relation to the international oil market. The sudden plunge in oil 
prices in 1985-86 led to a debt crisis and in 1998-9 another fall in oil prices forced Angola to turn 
to the IMF. Second, oil revenue has been used to finance military expenditure and thus affected 
the course and outcome of the civil war. Le Billon also suggests that not only the oil, but also the 
accessibility of two abundant resources (oil and diamonds) controlled by opposing groups 
prolonged the civil war beyond its cold war context (Le Billon 1999).    
  Third, the quality of governance has been affected by vast rents accruing to the state from 
oil exploitation. This has facilitated a system of presidential patronage, and is suspected to have 
led to an enormous enrichment at the top of the state ladder. This is however difficult to prove as 
much of the oil revenue is off budget. Fourth, it has affected the international relations of Angola. 
Due to competition amongst international oil companies for oil blocks, industrialized countries 
have been cautious in criticizing the Angolan government. Concerns in the West about the 
volatility of Middle East oil supplies have fuelled the importance of maintaining good relations 
with other oil producers. The oil wealth has reduced the potential leverage Western donors and 
institutions could have had through ‘conditionalities’ imposed by the IMF and the World Bank 
for loans. Fifth, he suggests that the culture of the country has been marked by the regional and 
international status of oil, and the military capacity that oil could buy. The military strength 
acquired by oil facilitated interventions in the two Congo’s in the nineties, helping to install 
friendly governments to end these countries positions as rear bases for the opposition groups 
UNITA and FLEC. The international and regional position has led many Angolans to believe that 
in spite of poor human development indicators and the destructions of the war, oil has made their 
country respected, or at least, is not to ‘be bullied with’ as other poorer African countries 
(Hodgens 2004:141-43).         
 The Angolan economy is a big paradox as living costs are high, while the majority of the 
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population is poor. Angola imports a high percentage of its food, making food prices artificially 
high in the capital Luanda. Luanda was even rated as the most expensive city to live in for 
foreign business visitors in 2010, with Tokyo coming second. Several residents of Luanda 
mentioned to me the case of a $100 dollar melon that had been sold in late 2010, and later made it 
to court as the buyer sued the seller for “profiteering.”22
4.2 Overview of China in Angola today 
In comparison, The Economist magazine 
suggests that an average Angolan laborer earns $50 a week (as always, statistics in Angola should 
be treated with caution). 
The rapid increase in bilateral trade flows in recent years remains by far the most notable 
feature of the increasingly intense relations between Luanda and Beijing.23
Chinese aid and assistance to African countries started in the 1950s (xinhuanet 2011). However, 
Angola, or the MPLA, does not have a long history of receiving Chinese assistance (Alves 
2010:6). During the civil war China supported UNITA and FNLA in the 1960s and 1970s, as the 
Soviet Union was a close ally of the MPLA.
 
24In the early eighties, China-Angola relations 
improved after recovering Sino-Soviet relations, and diplomatic ties were established in 1983. 
Relations were mainly confined to military cooperation in the eighties and nineties. This was in 
line with Sino-African relations in general in this period (Alden et al. 2008:5). Until the early 
2000s, Alves claims that the importance of the relationship between China and Angola was 
limited (Alves 2010:5). Bilateral trade between China and Angola rose from approximately $1 
billion in 2002, to $25 billion in 201025
                                                          
22 The case was dismissed on the ground of lacking evidence. The buyer had kept the receipt, but ironically, had 
eaten the melon (The Economist 2011b). 
. Because of these accelerated trade relations, Angola 
replaced South Africa as China’s major trading partner in Africa. In 2007, China also replaced 
the USA as Angola’s major trading partner, a position the USA had held ‘throughout most of the 
country’s modern history’. In 2008, 72% of total bilateral trade consisted of Chinese oil imports. 
Two thirds of Angola’s imports from China consist of construction materials and equipment used 
for infrastructure development. The rest consists of accessories, electrical appliances and 
furniture (Alves 2010:8-9).            
 The resource for infrastructure loans and the subsequent presence of Chinese construction 
23 Alves 2010:7 
24 China briefly supported the MPLA in the beginning of the civil war. 
25 Gov.cn (2011) 
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companies and workers are probably the most visible aspect of Sino-Angolan relations. 
According to Vines et al. (2009) the principal foreign labor force in Angola consisted of 
Portuguese workers until 2005. In 2006, nearly 15 000 Chinese workers in Angola made the 
Chinese the principal foreign labor force. Their number rose to 50 000 workers in 2008, and 
40 000 of them were employed in official bilateral infrastructure projects. According to the 
Chinese ambassador to Angola, by 2011 there were approximately 50 state-owned and 400 
private Chinese companies in Angola. There were about 60-70 000 Chinese expatriates working 
in Angola.26 Usually these migrant workers come on one or two year contracts, they live in 
closed compounds and return to China when their contracts are over (Vines et al. 2009:20, 42). 
Chinese construction companies mainly engage in the infrastructure sector, and came to Angola 
through the resource for infrastructure mechanism. They engage in many different sectors, 
ranging from building schools and hospitals to railways and electricity.    
  While there is no accurate data on this, indicators suggest that there is less Chinese 
investment outside of the oil sector in Angola than in other, comparable African countries such as 
DR Congo. Angola is ranked number 18th in terms of the amount of Chinese FDI to Africa, and 
Chinese FDI only accounts for 0.25 percent of Angola’s total FDI. The lack of Chinese FDI to 
Angola is a stark contrast to Angola’s position as China’s major trading partner in Africa (Corkin 
2011:3). While the Chinese Eximbank has extended the bulk of official Chinese credit, the China 
Development Bank extended its first credit-line for the agricultural sector in 2008-9. The state-
owned Industrial and Commercial Bank of China extended a loan to Angola in 2010. Official 
Chinese credits to Angola through the Eximbank, the ICBC and CDB are according to the 
Chinese ambassador to Angola $14.5 billion.27
                                                          
26 Channelnewsasia.com  2011 
 There is also a group of private Chinese investors 
who have extended credit-lines similar to the official Chinese credits under the name of China 
International Fund, amounting to $3.5 billion (Xiaoyang 2010:352).    
 We also see bilateral cooperation in other areas. According to Alves, bilateral cooperation 
beyond oil and construction mostly occurred in the aftermath of the 2004 resource for 
infrastructure credit (Alves 2010:6). Such bilateral cooperation includes scholarships for Angolan 
students to study in China, workshops for Angolan officials, and cooperation with the removal of 
landmines and in the agricultural sector. The Luanda General hospital was also financed by the 
27 Ibid. 
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aid program as a gift.          
 The importance of bilateral relations is underscored by frequent visits by heads of state or 
central government representatives from both countries. Direct air flights between China and 
Angola were established in 2009. That makes China the only Asian country that has direct air 
flights to Angola. Even though the bilateral cooperation has many dimensions, oil and 
infrastructure construction dominate trade relations between the two countries.   
4.3 Sonangol and oil-backed loans in Angola during the civil war 
During Angola’s long civil war (…), Sonangol emerged as Angola’s only competent state 
institution.28
To put the Chinese oil-backed loans in perspective, I will give a short description of the use of 
oil-backed loans in Angola during the civil war. Sonangol, Angola’s state owned oil company 
was, and is, vital in such transactions. Sonangol, was founded in 1976 by key members of the 
MPLA, and key members of the MPLA continue to be in leading positions in Sonangol. Soares 
de Oliveira suggests that Sonangol is the only functioning state apparatus in one of the world’s 
worst governed states (Soares de Oliveira 2007:595). In comparison to the MPLA that was 
Marxist to the end of the cold war, Sonangol operated on capitalistic principles from its 
beginning. Despite the MPLA’s reliance on Soviet and Cuban support, the American Chevron 
remained an investor in the oil industry even as the US supported the MPLA’s main opponent, 
the UNITA. The MPLA remained in control of the country’s oil revenues during the whole civil 
war through Sonangol. Even when it was estimated that 80% of the Angolan territory was 
occupied by the opposition in 1993, Sonangol and the primarily offshore oil production was not 
damaged (Soares de Oliveira 2007:603). There is said to be a place between Sonangol, the 
treasury and the central bank that is referred to as the ‘Bermuda triangle’ where large parts of 
Angola’s oil revenue ‘disappear without a trace” (Hodgens 2004:142). According to the IMF, 
between 1997 and 2002 the Angolan government received at least $4.2 billion from Sonangol 
they couldn’t account for (IMF 2003).        
 Due to a massive external debt
 
29
                                                          
28 Soares de Oliveira 2007. It is possible to argue that the military also is a well-functioning state entity; however, 
Sonangol is seen by some scholars as the only functioning civilian institution. 
 to foreign creditors such as the Soviet Union, Brazil and 
members of the Paris club, traditional commercial forms of borrowing money became 
29  By 1995 external debt was more than US$ 11 billion (Hodgens 2004:163) 
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unavailable to the Angolan government. From the early nineties oil-backed loans became the 
only way that Angola could secure credit. Credit was given by international banks and by export-
credit agencies, guaranteed with future oil-supplies, mostly done by Sonangol on behalf of the 
state. Because of Angola’s low credit rating these loans were costly30
4.4 Post-war Angola 
Angola is avoiding pressure to clean up corruption thanks to aid from China
. However, some argue that 
extra interest charges of US$ 50-100 million a year was a small price to pay to keep the IMF at 
bay (Le Billon 1999:27). These trends quickly led all oil physically accessible to the government 
through Sonangol to be tied up into servicing oil-guaranteed loans by the end of the nineties. By 
2000, oil-guaranteed debt accounted for 47 per cent of total external debt, or $4.99 billion. 
Hodgens claims that the composition of Angola’s debt, rather than the size of the debt, became 
the main problem. Fiscal revenue due from Sonangol was not paid to the treasury, nor recorded in 
the budget execution accounts because Sonangol was servicing debt on behalf of the state 
through its oil shipments. Oil-backed loans in Angola are thus according to him closely linked 
with problems of ‘extra-budgetary operations and with the central issues of transparency and 
accountability in government finances ‘(Hodgens 2004:163-5).     
 This shows that oil-backed loans are by no means a new mechanism that China 
introduced in Angola; rather it was an established mode of financing because Angola did not 
have any other options for credit. What was new with the Chinese credit-lines was the tying of 
the credit to infrastructure construction. It is also suggested that such loans carry further 
implications than loans that are not oil-backed, specifically regarding the off-budget handling of 
such loans and the following problems with accountability and transparency. 
31
After the end of the civil war, real GDP growth in Angola was rising as a result of the oil boom. 
However, the financial situation was rated by the IMF as ‘very poor’, poverty was widespread, 
the infrastructure was ruined and Angola was considered by the IMF to face ‘a serious 
humanitarian crisis” (Croese 2011:10).        
 During the war, the Angolan government had, as mentioned above, accumulated 
numerous loans. The debt made it difficult for the Angolan government to get external financing, 
 
                                                          
30 About 2 percentage points or more over London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), is the ‘benchmark rate’ of 
international lending with short maturities of four years or less (Hodgens 2004:163). 
31 News report cited in Brautigam 2009:274 
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at least without approval from an institution such as the IMF. However, it is important to note 
that Angola was not without options as it has often been portrayed in the media (Brautigam 
2009:274). According to Brautigam, The Paris club expected Angola to come to an agreement 
with the IMF, and a “donor conference” was planned to work out how the situation could be 
solved. An IMF agreement was considered a prerequisite for financial assistance, and a united 
front was supposed to wait with financial support to Angola until after the IMF approved of 
Angola’s financial situation. The IMF wanted Angola to implement an IMF program, and to 
show good performance for three trimesters before Angola would qualify for financial assistance. 
However, the Angolan government did not agree with the conditions, and the negotiations fell 
through in 2004. This was not the first time negotiations between Angola and the IMF had 
collapsed. However, Angola was not completely without access to financing, though the access to 
concessional financing was unavailable (Vines and Campos 2009:202). Even before the 
negotiations with the IMF collapsed, Germany settled a debt reduction unilaterally and extended 
new export credits while a French bank extended an oil-backed loan of $1.15 billion in 2003 
(Brautigam 2009:275).          
 The Chinese credit-lines came as an addition to this other external financing. China 
Construction Bank and Eximbank had already funded US$150 million for a number of 
infrastructure projects in 2002. However, in 2004, the same year as the IMF deal with Angola fell 
through; China extended the first oil for infrastructure credit line to Angola.    
 So, how does the Chinese Eximbank credit differ from other oil-backed credits previously 
extended to Angola? First of all, it gets a lot of attention. Brautigam writes that reports of “China 
in Africa” usually mentions the 2004 events in Angola as a “cautionary tale” against the 
consequences of China’s presence in Africa where financing from China is preferred to Western 
conditionalities. She also emphasizes that out of all the oil-backed credit Angola receives; only 
the credits extended by China makes the headlines. This seems to be the case also in Angola, 
where Chinese loans get the bulk of media attention.32
                                                          
32 Interview with Regina Santos, Economist Economist at the Catholic University in Angola, 19/1 2011 
 The oil-credit has been referred to as 
foreign aid numerous times, in academic studies (Kiala 2010) and news reports (Traub 2006). 
Technically, the Chinese credit was cheaper than the other credits Angola could obtain at the 
time. While Angola had been borrowing up to 2.5 percent over Libor, the Chinese loan was only 
1.5 percent over the benchmark (Brautigam 2009:274-5). Libor is the London Interbank Offered 
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rate, and is used as a benchmark for bank rates all over the world (Guardian 2007). Tying of the 
credit to infrastructure construction was also a new, unique feature that Brautigam, as mentioned 
in chapter two, suggests that China had learned through its own development experience.33
4.5 Defining the mechanisms: how does it work? 
 As 
Brautigam points out: “Oil companies and private banks have provided oil-producing countries 
with oil-backed loans for decades, but there was no tying of the loans to developmental purposes. 
This model of finance used for development and repaid with resources grew in part from China’s 
earlier experience as the recipient of aid, particularly aid from Japan.” (Brautigam 2009:56). 
 
The Chinese Eximbank extends the credit to Angola, and the credit line is according to Corkin 
jointly managed between the Angola Ministry of Finance, and the Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce (Corkin 2008:110-111). When a tender is announced, at least three pre-approved 
                                                          
33 Japan used the same resource for infrastructure type of contracts in China (Brautigam 2009) 
Figure 1: The 'Angola mode’. Based on authors interpretation of the existing literature on the subject. 
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Chinese companies compete against each other for the project. The implementation is overseen 
by an Angolan state agency, the GAT34
                                                          
34 Gabinete de apoio tecnico de gestão da linha de crédito da China 
 , and sectoral ministries manage the public works by for 
example making sure that nurses are hired to a hospital that is built (Vines and Campos 
2010:197). The available credit is held in an escrow account in China in the name of the Angolan 
government. Disbursements are made directly to the contractors by the Eximbank after the 
project is completed. Many commentators agree on this part of the resources for infrastructure 
contracts in Angola (Brautigam 2009; Corkin 2008; Vines et al. 2009). However, concerning the 
repayment to China there are different pieces of information. While we know that the Chinese 
Eximbank reimburses the construction companies, how is Angola repaying the loan? 
 According to Vines et al.: “Revenue from oil sold under this arrangement is deposited 
into an escrow account from which the exact amount towards servicing the debt is then deducted” 
(Vines et al. 2009:48). They do not cite a source, but presumably the information is from 
interviews conducted in Luanda for their report. They thus suggest that the revenue from Angolan 
oil is used to service the debt, but they don’t mention what oil company that extracts it (Angolan? 
Chinese? American?), or what oil block it is taken from.       
 A World Bank study claims that the Chinese credit lines are closely associated with oil 
production by a Chinese company in Angola. The study describes the process as a simultaneous 
process where infrastructure contracts are given to Chinese companies at the same time as a 
Chinese petroleum company is awarded rights to begin production in Angola:“ The government 
of the beneficiary country instructs the Chinese contractor to undertake infrastructure works, 
supported by the Chinese Ex-Im Bank, Repayment is in the form of oil produced directly by the 
Chinese petroleum company. “(Foster et al. 2009:55, emphasis added). They cite themselves as 
the source of this claim, but they base their study on newspaper articles and information available 
from government websites.        
 According to Brautigam, “Repayments for the loans spent to date have been made 
through direct shipments of oil from Block 18 (jointly operated by Chinese firm Sinopec, 
Angola’s state company Sonangol, a Hong Kong company China International Fund, and British 
Petroleum: BP)”(emphasis added). She cites Wikileaks as a source for this claim. Block 18 was 
the first Chinese NOC oil acquisition in Angola in 2004.       
 What to make of this? Unfortunately, there are no publicly available official documents 
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on the terms negotiated between the Chinese Eximbank and the Angolan government. The lack of 
a publicly available document makes it slightly more difficult to assess what the terms of the 
agreement are. As they may all have different puzzles of the picture, it is not possible to say who 
is right, or whether they all are. There is not enough public information to confirm or disconfirm 
any of these assumptions on the details of this part of the agreement. Unfortunately I was not able 
to shed more light on this mechanism through my interviews in Luanda. As the credit has been 
extended several times, it is also possible that there have been different conditions, formally or 
informally linked with the agreement. We do know that the credit is paid with oil, but we do not 
know if this is through direct shipment of crude oil, with revenue from oil, or how the amount is 
calculated. However, when assessing the available sources I chose to use Vines and Campos as 
the most reliable source as they have conducted fieldwork in Angola numerous times, and belong 
to a recognized research institution. The crude oil is probably shipped to a Chinese refinery, and 
the sale of the oil is then put into an escrow account in China. Thereafter, Chinese companies are 
paid from that account after the completion of each project.      
 While the credit is payable over 12 years at the concessional rate of 1.5 percent over 
Libor, how is the price determined? According to Brautigam:“China Eximbank president Li 
Ruogu has stated that his bank uses market prices in repayment arrangements for its commodity-
secured lines of credit (Brautigam forthcoming(b):7)”. Corkin also claims that the oil price is not 
fixed, as it used to be in the more expensive oil-credits Angola got during the civil war. It follows 
the market fluctuations, and is thus not discounted in price. If this is the case, what do the 
Chinese gain from the oil-backing? According to Foster et al. “China is able to gain physical 
security over oil resources, normally at a slightly discounted price” (Foster et al. 2009:56). In this 
case I will use the official Eximbank statement, and assume that the oil is priced in accordance 
with market fluctuations. If this is so, the only oil gain for China seems to be that they were able 
to secure steady supply rather than as insuring against price increases. Nevertheless, it is possible 
to question why China would need such a contract as it would be easier to just buy oil from for 
example Angola at the international market to the same price. Why secure access to purchase a 
natural resource to market price when you could buy it at the international market at the same 
prices, and without complicated contracts?         
 One answer to this is access to oil equity. When Chinese NOCs first entered the Angolan 
oil equity market in the aftermath of the 2004 ‘resources for infrastructure’ contracts they did 
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experience some initial success. In 2004 the Chinese NOC Sinopec for the first time acquired oil 
equity in Angola. A 50 percent stake was for sale by Shell in block 18 operated by BP, and it was 
sold with some controversy. Initially, Shell had agreed in April 2004 to sell its stake to the Indian 
state-owned company Videsh. However, Sonangol decided to apply its pre-emptive rights on 
block 18, and a joint venture between Sonangol and Sinopec; Sonangol Sinopec International 
(SSI) was established. Sinopec holds a 55 percent stake in SSI, but the arrangement took place 
under the ‘umbrella’ of the private Chinese investors, the Queensway 88 group that also offered 
private credit-lines to Angola. Through Dayuan International Development LTd, the group holds 
a 31.5 percent share in SSI. The last 13.5 percent is held by China Sonangol International 
Holding, which is a Sonangol joint venture fully backed by the Angolan presidency. In 2006, SSI 
acquired three stakes in new ultra-deep-water blocks. The bids were the ‘highest ever offered for 
oil acreage anywhere in the world’ (Alves 2010:17-19). However, there seems to be some 
agreement in the literature that after an initial success in acquiring oil equity in the aftermath of 
the 2004 credit-line, Chinese NOCs have lately been unsuccessful in securing additional oil 
equity in Angola (Alves 2010; Corkin 2011). This has however not stopped new Eximbank 
credits from being extended to Angola, questioning the direct link between oil equity acquisition 
and the Chinese oil-backed credit. This will be further discussed in chapter five.    
 Tied to the loan is the agreement that 70 percent of the public tenders will be awarded to 
Chinese companies pre-approved by Beijing. The rest of the 30 percent is to be subcontracted to 
Angolan companies. However, in practice Corkin suggests that this is limited to make certain that 
30 percent of contracted labor is Angolan. This will be discussed further in chapter five. 50 
percent of procurement (materials etc) has to come from China (Corkin 2011:171). Corkin argues 
that Angola was far from a passive player in negotiations with China, and points to the 30 percent 
reserved for Angolan companies. As the Chinese credit is an export credit that aims to promote 
Chinese exports, she claims that 30 percent reserved to Angolan contractors was quite a large 
concession from China’s side. The Chinese export-credits are to my knowledge the only export-
credits in Angola with this clause.35
                                                          
35 None of the representatives from the other countries I talked to with export-credits in Angola knew of such 
arrangements with their export-credit, this includes Germany, Brazil, Spain, Portugal, USA 
       
 According to Corkin, the Eximbank’s lending policy is “to structure a loan so that there is 
a revenue stream that will be able to support the debt repayment” (Corkin 2011:173). The 
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Eximbank initially rejected the Angolan Ministry of Finance’s offer of state guarantee, and 
demanded additional security. “It was only allegedly when the Chinese Ministry of Finance 
intervened to persuade Exim Bank to waive this insurance payment that the loans structure was 
agreed upon” (ibid).  There is a power struggle internally in China, and it seems like the 
Eximbank leadership is more commercially oriented than the Chinese government perhaps would 
want them to. However, the Eximbank did change due to intervention from the Chinese 
government. So, the Eximbank follows a political agenda, but reluctantly, and this may change 
with internal power struggles.         
 Brautigam suggests that Sinosure is an essential part of the requirement of natural 
resource security. Sinosure is China’s official export credit insurance company, and was 
established in 2001. According to Brautigam, this state agency refuses to insure export credit 
lines that are deemed too risky. However, insurance can be obtained with additional security: “To 
the Chinese, even resource-poor countries whose balance sheets may not look good sometimes 
have untapped capacity to service a future debt, if borrowing goes for productive projects” 
(Brautigam 2010a:15). Natural resources are an example of ‘untapped capacity’. The Eximbank 
would thus not be able to insure the export credit to a country with poor credit, and without 
additional collateral. 
4.7 China Eximbank versus the China International Fund  
According to Corkin: “What is perhaps unique in Angola’s situation is the presence of two 
seemingly parallel and unrelated financing structures directed from China to the Angolan 
government” (Corkin 2011:172). The Queensway 88 group is behind the China International 
Fund (CIF) credits to the Angolan government that operates similarly, but distinctively from the 
Chinese Eximbank. The group is portrayed to be a private, Hong Kong based firm, but the 
authors of a US commissioned report suggest that they have links to the Ministry of Public 
Security and the Ministry of State Security in China (Lewkowitz et al. 2009:ii). The group 
operates credits through CIF, and these credits are often reported as official Chinese credit by 
media and some scholars. These arrangements have three similarities 1) the size 2) the oil 
backing 3) that they are tied to infrastructure projects. They differ in administration, being 
managed by different Angolan institutions as the CIF credit is administered by the GRN office. 
They also differ in degree of transparency as the Eximbank loans are more transparent 
(Lewkowitz et al. 2009:15). However, it is difficult to prove that these credits are in fact extended 
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by the Chinese government and Chinese officials have denied any connection to the Chinese 
government (Vines et al. 2009:50). There have been some problems with the execution of the 
projects from the CIF, and construction on their projects in Angola came to a halt during long 
periods in 2007-8. According to Vines et al., financial and planning problems seem to have 
contributed to the delay and some funds from the Chinese Eximbank credit were used to start 
construction of CIF projects again (Vines et al. 2009:53). Because several of the same Chinese 
companies have worked both on Eximbank and CIF projects, the agencies have been difficult to 
tell apart in practice: “This situation has been complicated by the fact that most of the companies 
hired to undertake projects funded by CIF are the same ones working for projects under the 
EXIM Bank credit lines”(Alves 2010b:6). Keeping this in mind, it is important to note that all 
that looks like official Chinese credit and construction is not necessarily provided by the Chinese 
government. There is an additional layer of confusion because the investors behind the CIF credit 
holds a 31.5 share in Sonangol Sinopec International and additionally is in a joint venture with 
Sonangol through China Sonangol International Holding (CSIH).      
 Allegations of mismanagement of the Chinese funds appeared in the Angolan media both 
in 2004 and 2007(Vines et al. 2009). According to Angolan media, there was a struggle within 
the Angolan leadership for access to the 2004 Chinese credit line. While the official Chinese 
credit-lines are as mentioned administered by the Angolan Ministry of Finance, the private China 
International Fund credit is managed by a separate entity, the GRN that operate with off-budget 
funds. The GRN is the National Reconstruction Office, and was created by President dos Santos 
in 2005 to ‘manage large investment projects and ensure rapid infrastructural reconstruction prior 
to national election’. However, there was also said to be an assumption that ‘the ministries would 
not have the organizational and technical capacity to manage the large inflows of money directed 
to the National Reconstruction Program’. Rumors say that GRN was established after concerns 
from the Chinese side of rent-seeking Angolan officials. In 2007, during the trial of an Angolan 
security chief for insurrection he threatened to reveal names of persons in senior government 
positions who had profited from the Chinese credit lines. In response to this, the government 
published details of the credit lines managed by the ministry in 2007. However “Unlike projects 
managed by the Ministry of Finance, it is unclear how much money is directly managed by the 
GRN, how funds are allocated among projects, and how much money has been spent so far” 
(Vines et al. 2009:54-55). In the state budget of 2009, the figures reported concerning the 
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available CIF credit are significantly lower than the numbers reported by the World Bank and the 
media.36
 
 The amount of credit provided by this group was estimated by the World Bank to be 
$9.8 billion, but recent information has suggested that it is $2.9 billion. Vines et al. propose two 
possible different explanations for this. The first is that the projects are cut back because CIF was 
incapable of raising the promised credit. The second possible explanation is that a large part of 
the GRN expenditure could be off-budget (Vines et al. 2009:53). This overview shows that there 
is still uncertainty regarding the details of the complex resources for infrastructure contracts. 
While there is more information available on the official Chinese credits, there are still many 
uncertainties.            
 To sum up, in this chapter I have discussed the importance of oil and oil-backed loans in 
Angola to contextualize the Chinese credit. I have also looked at what type of situation Angola 
was in when the mechanism was negotiated. Further I have discussed how this mechanism works, 
and concluded that there are still many unknowns concerning the process. However, we do know 
that the Chinese Eximbank reimburses Chinese companies directly, but the links with oil equity 
acquisition of Chinese NOCs and how the oil is used in the repayment is still unclear.  In 2004, 
the credits seem to be linked in some way with oil equity acquisition as both Chinese NOCs, and 
the group of investors behind the CIF credit gained inroads into the Angolan oil market. This will 
be used as a basis to discuss whether there has been any change in the mechanism, and whether 
the mechanism is indeed used to secure natural resources.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
36 Total amount in state budget: $125 million 
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Chapter five - Analyzing evidence 
 
5. Introduction 
In this chapter I will first examine the first question in my research question: how has the 
resource for infrastructure mechanism developed since its implementation? Here I will focus on 
internal factors that have changed in Angola since 2004, and how this may have affected the 
development of the resource for infrastructure mechanism in Angola. In this process I will 
discuss the Angolan policy of diversification.  In 2004, Angola had few other options for 
financing, making the official Chinese credit-line essential for Angola’s reconstruction process. I 
will also discuss the development of Angola’s economic situation. Now that Angola has 
improved its economy and actively sought to diversify its economic partners it may have an 
impact on the resources for infrastructure  mechanism that was first negotiated when Angola had 
few other options.           
 Further I will discuss the second part of my research question whether the resources for 
infrastructure contracts are a mechanism to secure a steady supply of natural resources from 
Angola to China. As evidence is dispersed it is difficult to discuss the hypotheses separately. I 
will first examine the empirical evidence to collect indicators that will be used to discuss the 
hypotheses. I will look at the impact the oil for infrastructure loans have had on infrastructure in 
Angola, and oil supply and infrastructure contracts for China. Then I will compare the 
mechanism in Angola with other comparable countries which have engaged in resource for 
infrastructure contracts. In this process I will explore possible patterns of the resources for 
infrastructure contracts that lay the ground for formulating a new hypothesis. Last I will discuss 
the indicators from the empirical evidence in relation to the hypotheses formulated in chapter 
two.  
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5.1. China and Angola 
Table 2: Chinese official financing to Angola37
 
 
As we can see from Table 2, the oil-backed Eximbank loans are no longer the only Chinese 
official financing in town. Corkin argues that the resources for infrastructure contracts should be 
viewed as a moment in time rather than as an model of Chinese engagement: “Far from serving 
as a kind of ‘model’ for other resource rich countries’ relations with China, it has been suggested 
that the strategic partnership forged between Luanda and Beijing was done so at an opportune 
moment of equal need, for financing and oil resources respectively” (Corkin 2011:4).
 Nevertheless, it could be a model of conjuncture when countries have complimentary 
needs. China’s need for oil resources has not changed since the implementation of the first oil for 
infrastructure credit extended in 2004. This could imply that any change in the relationship 
between China and Angola is driven by the changing needs of Angola rather than any change 
from China’s side. Or it could mean that Chinese agencies no longer saw the need for an oil 
backed credit as Angola’s economy improves. Some scholars argue that the ‘Angola mode’ is 
nothing new as oil-backed credits has been used in Angola for a number of years, and because 
oil-backed credits are common in the oil industry (Corkin 2011; Vines et al. 2009). However, 
while acknowledging that oil-backed credit has been widely used before,  Brautigam suggests 
that the oil for infrastructure mechanism is a result of China’s own development experience of 
how countries can benefit from cooperating at different stages of development (Brautigam 
2009:47). Even in China, this approach was used during its own development and was not an 
                                                          
37 2002 figure from Campos and Vines 2007:6.  2004 and 2007 numbers from the Angolan Ministry of Finance 
(2008). 2010 Eximbank figure and China Development Bank figure is from Corkin 2011:171. China Industrial and 
Commercial Bank figure is from ICBC (2010).  
Year How much? Who? Oil-Backed Purpose 
2002 $145 million China Eximbank, China Construction 
Bank 
No Infrastructure  
2004 $2 billion China Eximbank Yes Infrastructure 
2007 $2 billion China Eximbank Yes Infrastructure 
2007 $500 million China Eximbank Yes Infrastructure 
2008 $1 billion China Development Bank No Agriculture 
2010 $6 billion China Eximbank Not known Infrastructure 
2010 $2.5 billion China Industrial and Commercial Bank No Not Known 
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approach that is sustained today. We may see tendencies that also Angola has transcended the 
resource for infrastructure approach.     
5.2. The Angolan policy of diversification. 
Considered a ‘quick fix’ at the time, Luanda is now wary of allowing Chinese interests to hold 
too much sway in the economy38
Angola has a stated policy of diversifying its financial partners, a policy that is influenced by the 
dependence the MPLA had on one economic partner, the Soviet Union, during parts of the civil 
war. Angola has made arrangements of export-credit with several other countries since the first 
Chinese oil-backed credit line was extended in 2004. Spain, Germany, Brazil, Canada, Portugal, 
Israel and India have all extended export-credits to Angola for ‘public project investment’ 
(Croese 2011). This suggests that Angola is not interested in relying solely on the Chinese credit-
lines, and that the Angolan government is careful with letting one external actor have too much 
influence. Still, evidence suggests that these lines are not being used in full. Available credit does 
not automatically transfer into used funds. This seems to be because of a lack of ability or 
capacity from the Angolan side, as Angola may have more available export credit than they have 
been able to, or want to use. According to a source in the Angolan Ministry of Finance, the ability 
to draw from the credit-lines is huge, but not all of it is being used. 
  
39 This was confirmed by 
representatives from several countries that had extended credit-lines to Angola. They expressed 
an interest from their side of more use of these credits.40In fact, the Angolan government 
announced in 2010 that no more agreements of export-credit would be made, underscoring the 
sufficient amount of such credits41. Both local academics and entrepreneurs have expressed 
skepticism towards the use of export-credits whether they come from China or from other 
countries. 42 As one local academic said: “When they come they bring the infrastructure, but they 
don’t bring the capacity for the people to do the same.”43
                                                          
38 Corkin 2011:177 
This underscores the problem of 
financing companies from other countries to do infrastructure construction with limited local 
participation. The diversification policy is not limited to securing export credits as the Angolan 
39 Interview with Source at the Angolan Ministry of Finance, 31/1 2011 
40 Interview with Ladonna S.Sales, Economic Officer at the US embassy,  27\1 2011 and Manuel Sanchez Melero,  
Economic and commercial console at the Spanish embassy in Luanda, 24/1 2011 
41 Interview with Ana Maria Carvalho, Communications and External Affairs at the World Bank,  27\1 2011 
42 Interview with Manuel Alves de Rocha, Economist at the Catholic University in Angola, 28/1 2011 
43 Interview Regina Santos, Economist Economist at the Catholic University in Angola, 19/1 2011 
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government has actively sought investment and support from other partners such as the IMF. This 
will be discussed further in the next section.       
 How do these other export-credits compare to the official Chinese export credits? Corkin 
argues that:”Chinese financing seems to have encouraged other countries to extend credit lines in 
order to allow their own companies to compete on similar footing” (Corkin 2011:3). This was in 
line with, and encouraged by Luanda in its quest not to let a single foreign trade partner dominate 
their economy. Angola’s poor credit and consequent problems of getting other types of financing 
combined with Angola’s huge need for infrastructure after the civil war is a combination of 
factors that seem to have triggered the extent of export-credit. All the export-credit functions as 
export-credit do: by financing companies from the countries that extend credits to operate in the 
receiving country. Even though they are mainly used for infrastructure construction, they are not 
all sector specific (such as the German credit line44).While the Chinese credit-lines may have 
worked as a catalyst for other credit-lines, few of them are backed by oil, which is a central 
mechanism of the ‘Angola mode’. This is due to a clear intention from the Angolan side of using 
state guarantees instead of oil as security. Portugal is an example of a country that used to extend 
oil-backed credits to Angola, but that now accepts state guarantees instead. According to an 
employee at the Portuguese embassy: “In the past, the Portuguese credit-lines were linked up 
with oil. Now it’s not anymore because the Angolans don’t want it.”45 The Brazilian and Israel 
export-credits are strikingly similar to the Chinese export-credit as they are backed up by oil. The 
Israeli credit-line of $750 million is however extended by a private enterprise located in Israel 
(LR Luminar Finance Limited).46
                                                          
44 Correspondence with German embassy in Luanda 2/3 2011 
 The Brazilian credit-line is on the other hand extended by 
Brazilian Proex ($580 million), and the Brazilian Development Bank ($750 million), both of 
which are state agencies. It is paid with a contract of oil supplies, and used to finance 
infrastructure construction from companies from Brazil and Israel.     
 The Brazilian credit-line is similar to the Chinese oil for infrastructure mechanism as it is 
both oil-backed, and provided by state agencies. As Vines et al. note:“ for years Brazil has 
enjoyed a credit arrangement, backed by the production of 20,000 b/d, under which Banco do 
Brasil provides payment guarantees for major construction projects” (Vines et al. 2009:46). 
45 Interview with Maria Teresa Gomes Mateus, Counselor for Economic Cooperation at the Portuguese Embassy, 
18/1 2011 
46 Croese 2011:32. No date provided as to when it was negotiated. 
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 However, Croese writes that: “It must be noted that contrary to the Exim Bank loans, 
information on the management and execution of projects carried out with Brazilian funds has 
not been made publically available” (Croese 2011:15). The availability of information of the 
Chinese credit-lines may be due to the media attention, and allegations of embezzlement 
concerning the Chinese credit-lines. However, this also makes it more difficult to compare the 
Chinese and Brazilian approach. Here we see a similarity in opacity between the Brazilian credit 
lines, and the CIF credit lines. A representative of the Brazilian embassy said that they employ 
more locals than the Chinese do, and that they followed the Angolan labor law limiting the 
amount of foreign workers on projects.47
5.3 Angola’s economic situation 
If this is the case, it does not seem like the Brazilians 
have negotiated the same exception from the Angolan labor law as China has. Unfortunately 
there is no official, reliable statistic on how many Angolan workers are hired in all of the 
different projects construction firms, so it is difficult to confirm. The amount of local workers on 
Chinese projects will be further discussed in section 7.2.      
 The group of private investors has copied the mechanism used by the Chinese 
government. Nevertheless, as noted in section 4, there is more opacity regarding the CIF-credits, 
so it is difficult to know whether the agreement is comparable in terms of percentage reserved to 
Angolan companies. We can thus see that several agents have offered similar contracts internally 
in Angola; backed by oil, tied to exports and used for infrastructure development. However, this 
model may not be sustainable internally in Angola, and can be seen as a moment in time as well. 
There is no doubt that Angola was in dire need of infrastructure on a scale that only a 27 year 
long war can create. The oil for infrastructure contracts has expanded further than the official 
Chinese government credits internally in Angola. However, some argue that there is in fact 
nothing unique with the Chinese oil for infrastructure contracts. Vines et al. suggest that “The 
only unique thing about the ‘Angola mode’ is that Chinese engagement has been quick and the 
loans have been large” (Vines et al. 2009:57).        
Several sources suggest that when China offered financing through the Eximbank in 2004, 
Angola had no other alternative. A World Bank employee stated that: “They were desperate”. 48
                                                          
47 Interview with Edson Santiago, Secretary of the Brazilian Embassy in Luanda , 21/1 2011 
 
As discussed in chapter four, Angola did have access to some other financing, still, it was 
48 Interview with Ana Maria Carvalho, Communications and External Affairs at the World Bank,  27\1 2011 
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expensive and not on the scale that Angola needed to rebuild the war-torn country. Nevertheless, 
Angola’s international financial situation seems to have changed dramatically from 2004 to 2010. 
This we can see clearly in the differences between the IMF agreement that fell through in 2004, 
and the IMF agreement that was implemented in 2010. In 2004, the IMF demanded a Staff 
Monitoring Program (SMP) due to Angola’s economic situation. According to Human Rights 
Watch, the IMF had already tried negotiating SMP in Angola four times between 1995 and 2000. 
However, each time it failed, either during negotiations or under implementation. A SMP is a set 
of economic reforms negotiated with the IMF that the government implements and that the IMF 
further monitors over six months, or longer. A SMP is a precursor to formal IMF lending (HRW 
2004). In 2009\2010 on the other hand, Angola’s economic situation was far better, and the 
government negotiated a Stand-By Agreement (SBA). SBA is the IMF’s main lending instrument 
for emerging economies. Rates are non-concessional, but usually lower than market rates (IMF 
2010). Angola was thus able to secure an IMF loan without implementing any SMP because the 
government had improved the economic conditions by themselves.     
 It is suggested that the presence of the Chinese credit-lines have increased the leverage of 
the Angolan government internationally to resist Western conditionalities due to the alternative of 
Chinese financing (Soares de Oliveira 2008). However, according to Alves and Alden, it has been 
Angola’s oil revenue rather than China’s credit-lines that has ensured Angola’s freedom. While 
they support the claim that the Chinese credit lines helped keep IMF ‘at bay’ in 2004, Angola’s 
oil revenue is the reason that Angola has gained ‘independence of action’. The oil revenue has 
allowed the government to repay large amounts of its outstanding debts, increase budget 
spending with 30 percent, and negotiate oil-backed loans from both public and private 
institutions. However, the oil-backed loans are intended to be ‘gradually replaced’ with issuing of 
treasury bonds that will finance further infrastructure reconstruction” (Alves and Alden 2009:19).
 It is suggested that the Chinese credit-lines have facilitated an avoidance of issues of 
accountability and transparency in Angola. We can nevertheless see signs that Angola is 
improving in terms of international financial standards. Human Rights Watch suggests that since 
2009, falling oil and diamond prices and the global economic crisis has ‘forced’ Angola seek 
more support from institutions such as the IMF. They cite the standby-agreement with IMF of 
2009 as evidence of this (HRW 2011). There seems to have been an increased degree of 
transparency because the Angolan government wishes to borrow from the international market 
54 
 
rather than relying on oil-credit.49 In 2010, Angola was for the first time rated by three 
independent financial rating agencies, Moodys, Standard&Poor and Fitch. Angola was rated with 
a B+ by Fitch and Standard & Poor, and a B1 from Moodys. According to Standard and Poor, the 
rating was “supported by the outlook for oil production, strong economic growth prospects and 
low levels of government debt” (Reuters 2010).  Standard and Poor differ between speculative 
and investment grade debt. Investment grade is regarded as a ‘suitable investment’ while 
speculative grade indicates: ‘ability to pay, but faces significant uncertainties’ (Standard and Poor 
2010:10). The B+ is approximately three steps below investment grade, but is nonetheless 
impressive considering the financial situation Angola was in after the civil war. Angola needs 
such ratings to be allowed to borrow from the international financial market, and the rating is a 
first step towards that.  Angola has announced its intention to raise $4 billion in the international 
market, and is clearly working towards that goal. To be able to be rated by international credit 
agencies, the agencies need insight into government budgets so this rating may have increased 
transparency. As a source from the Angolan Ministry of Finance said: “It is difficult to lie to 
Moodys”50
5.4 What does the ‘Angola mode’ mean for Angola’s infrastructure development?  
           
 What has changed since 2004? There is additional Chinese financing that is not secured 
by oil. Angola has improved its economy, and actively sought to diversify its financial partners. 
Evidence such as the IMF agreement, ratings from international credit agencies, the 
announcement of a stop in additional export-credit lines, and that the existing credits are not 
being used in full, suggests that the Angolans are eager to obtain other types of financing than the 
established resources for infrastructure mechanism. Angola’s economic situation has changed 
from one where the country had an enormous debt and little available credit to a situation where 
it no longer needs an oil guarantee to secure credit from external actors.  
“Three companies bid on a construction tender. An Angolan minister opens the bids. A Chinese 
company offers to do the work for $3 million: $1 million for labor, $1 million for equipment, $1 
million profit. A European company says it can do the job for $6 million: $2 million for labor, $2 
million for equipment, $2 million for profit, but the quality will be better. An Angolan contractor 
                                                          
49 Interview with Source at the Angolan Ministry of Finance, 31/1 2011 
50 Interview with Source at the Angolan Ministry of Finance, 31/1 2011 
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bids $9 million: $3 million for you, $3 million for me, and $3 million for the Chinese to do the 
work.” 
This is a joke that according to Brautigam (2009:153) was circulating amongst contractors in 
Angola. I also heard it mentioned several times when I was there. Brautigam suggests that the 
mechanisms where the money is paid directly by the Chinese Eximbank to the Chinese 
construction firms could bypass embezzlement opportunities and ensure that the Angolan oil 
translates to development projects for the Angolan people: “for the first time, there was hope that 
some of Angola’s riches might actually be translated directly into development projects” 
(Brautigam 2009:276).         
 But what has actually been built as a result of the Chinese credit lines? I will first look at 
projects financed by the Chinese Eximbank, then at projects financed by the CIF.   
Sector Number of 
projects phase 1 
Number of 
projects phase 2 
Complimentary 
financing 
Total 
Health 9 7 3 19 
Education 20 33 7 60 
Energy and 
water 
8 4 5 17 
Agriculture 6 4 0 10 
Fisheries  3 1 4 
Transport 1 0 0 1 
Communication 0 4 1 5 
Public works 0 2 1 3 
Total 44 53 18            119 
Total value   $1,000,000,00051 $1,104,931,344  $ 546,717,590 $ 2651648934 
 Table 3: Completed Eximbank projects as of 200852
The numbers from Table 3 are from the Angolan Ministry of Finance, and they are publicly 
available online. All projects are infrastructure construction projects in different sectors. 
Unfortunately the numbers were last updated in June 2008, so it does not include projects that 
could have been completed at a later stage. However, with such a list of projects it is possible to 
see how the first $2.5 billion extended have been utilized. The first $2 billion credit-line from the 
Eximbank that was extended in 2004 was used in two tranches, phase 1 and phase 2. The 
complimentary financing is the $500 million credit that was extended by the Eximbank in 2007. 
 
                                                          
51 Numbers from phase 1 is not specified as accurate as phase two and complimentary financing on the overview 
from the Angolan Ministry of Finance. 
52 Angolan Ministry of finance (2008) 
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Phase 3 consists of the $2 billion extended by the Eximbank in 2007, and there is available a 
framework of projects, but no information concerning how far the implementation has gone. In 
the third phase, projects include rehabilitation and expansion of electricity networks in Luanda 
and five other cities, improving water supply to Luanda, and infrastructure construction in 
unspecified sector in three regions. The proposed projects in the framework agreement are not 
included in the table.  From the table we can see that building of schools have been a priority as 
this sector has the largest number of projects, followed by the health and energy sector.   
 While it is possible to find a list over proposed GRN projects from 2007, it is not possible 
to find breakdowns as to which projects are financed or co-financed with the credit from China 
International Fund, or of which projects that are completed.  Because of this, projects from the 
CIF credit lines that are managed by the GRN are more difficult to track than the projects 
financed by the Eximbank. It was announced that the credit was to be used for large scale 
prestige projects such as: “the Luanda International Airport, the Caminhos de Ferro de Luanda 
railway project, drainage systems in the capital and studies on the new city of Luanda, as well as 
work on the Luanda-Lobito, Malanje-Saurimo, Saurimo-Dondo and Saurim-Luena highways” 
(Macauhub 2007). In 2007, the year before the elections, the Angolan government even promised 
to build ‘1 million houses’ in Angola by 2012. CIF was supposed to be one of the main financiers 
of this project. However, it became known in the aftermath of the 2008 CIF construction delays 
that the Angolan government had reduced the estimate of the available CIF credit by two thirds, 
and some of the proposed projects became open for other contractors. In September 2010, 
president dos Santos announced the end of GRN. The management of the housing projects run by 
GRN would be relocated to Sonip, a ‘subsidiary of the state oil company that manages its real 
estate’. The infrastructure projects in other areas such as roads, railways and rehabilitation of 
social infrastructure would be transferred to other ‘relevant entities’. The problem with assessing 
the progress of the GRN projects is according to Croese that:”Concrete public information on the 
actual progress made on the objectives of the National Urbanism and Housing Program is 
extremely hard to come by”  (Croese 2011:22). While the CIF credit-lines are not extended by the 
Chinese government, they are perceived as the same by the public, and they use many of the 
same Chinese construction firms. The completion of infrastructure projects is just one dimension 
of the ‘Angola mode’. Just as important are other parts concerning the mechanisms of this 
engagement such as long-term sustainability and local content.      
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Long-term sustainability 
We can identify three dimensions of long-term sustainability; quality and maintenance and 
operation. While many projects have been completed, concerns have been raised of the quality of 
the Chinese projects. There are no clear numbers, but some anecdotic evidence has been used to 
construct the argument of the poor quality of Chinese construction. The Luanda General Hospital 
has been used in several news reports as an example of the poor quality of Chinese construction. 
The hospital was finished in 2006, but was closed already in 2010 due to subsidence. According 
to Brautigam, the Chinese government sent out a team to investigate this and concluded that the 
problem was ‘partly Angolan and partly Chinese’. They concluded that it was a result of 
inadequate geological data provided by the Angolans that made the design by the Chinese 
architects flawed. In addition, the Chinese company took responsibility for not adequately 
supervising the Angolan labor force on the projects (reported to be 90 percent). The Chinese 
government has taken full responsibility, and announced that the hospital will be repaired. 
However, she also emphasizes that this hospital was part of the aid program which is regarded as 
an important tool of diplomacy, and that’s why the Chinese government took the financial 
responsibility of financing the new construction of the hospital. 53This is one example that 
continues to circulate in news reports, while no other concrete examples are given.54
                                                          
53 Brautigam in chinaafricarealstory.com  ( 2010) 
 However, 
allegations of poor quality of construction do not seem to be a unique Chinese phenomenon in 
Angola. It was suggested to me in an informal conversation in Angola that the roads that 
Brazilian companies built were not of the same quality in Angola as the roads they built at home, 
just as the Chinese were capable of constructing better buildings than they do in Angola. 
According to the Angolan journalist Marques de Morais, poor construction work is nothing new 
in Angola as Brazilian and Portuguese companies have exploited an environment of corruption 
and disregard for public safety for years. There is even a separate vocabulary for the resulting 
public works in Angola such as ‘disposable roads’ and ‘Styrofoam bridges’ that was established 
in Angola long before Chinese construction firms entered Angola (Marques de Morais 2011)  
  Lack of maintenance of physical infrastructure is a problem throughout Africa. 
Due to the requirement of the use of Chinese goods, spare parts sometimes have to be ordered 
from China if something is broken. I experienced this myself when I was in Angola. At the 
54 Used in Marques de Morais (2007), Redvers (2011)  
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Catholic university in Luanda all the air-conditioners were changed. I was told that it was 
because one air-conditioner was broke, and they would have to order a container of spare parts 
from China to fix it. Thus it would be just as expensive to buy new ones. While the new air-
conditioner may have other explanations, the extent of parts that has to be ordered from far away 
represents an obvious challenge for Angola to maintain the infrastructure that is built.   
 What Angola will use the new infrastructure for is another question. While it is still early 
to draw conclusions, concerns have been raised of the operation of the new structures.  As the 
Chinese ambassador to Angola said: “Now they have schools but lack teachers. They have 
hospitals but no doctors.”55
Local content 
As Corkin point out: “There are also fears that the massive 
infrastructural spending planned by the government will be misdirected if it is not complemented 
by capacity-building and training programs to improve Angola’s ability to absorb investment of 
such magnitude” (Corkin 2011:171). The fact that Chinese construction companies bring in a 
large amount of Chinese workers obviously represent a challenge in terms of local capacity 
building.    
China has often been criticized for bringing in a large amount of Chinese workers to construction 
projects in Africa. In Angola there seems to be a higher degree of Chinese workers than in other 
African countries (Corkin et al. 2008). This may be due to the language barrier or the lack of 
human capital in Angola after the long civil war. According to a report by the Centre for Chinese 
Studies at Stellenbosch University, Chinese enterprises that operate under the official credit lines 
are exempted from the Angolan labor law, so they are not required to follow the limit on 
expatriate workers (Hon et al. 2010:4-5). That means that fewer locals are hired, and in addition, 
the ones that are hired usually perform menial tasks. Several scholars have suggested that the 30 
percent participation for Angolan companies may be limited to ensuring that there are 30 percent 
Angolans on the workforce. However, evidence suggests that the numbers of Angolan workers 
are in fact much higher than 30 percent on average. 
 
 
                                                          
55 Channelnewsasia.com  (2011) 
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Financed by Chinese Angolan  Others Total Local employment (%) 
Eximbank 1264 1872 0 3136 59.7 
GRN 1580 2030 0 3610 56.2 
Private Business 509 1580 36 2125 74.4 
Total 3353 5482 36 8871 61.8 
Table 4: Differences in local employment in Chinese companies in Angola (from Xiaoyang 201056
 
) 
Table 4 is an overview of 3353 of an estimated 60 000 to 70 000 Chinese expatriates working in 
Angola. There can be big variations between projects, and it is not possible to know if these 
numbers are representative. Nevertheless, it shows that the local labor force may not be as small 
part of the workforce as assumed, and that there are indeed less local employees employed in the 
projects that are administered directly by the Angolan Ministry of Finance or GRN.  
 The same study claims that if a Chinese company had been in Angola for five years, the 
ratio of local workers were twice as big as for companies that had just established themselves in 
Angola (Xiaoyang 2011) There are mainly three ways that Chinese companies use when they 
enter the Angolan market, through the Eximbank credit-line, through the CIF credit-line, or on 
their own. There are a smaller percentage of Angolan workers employed through the official 
credit line than through private Chinese companies that enter the Angolan market on their own. 
All private businesses operating in Angola must register at the National Agency for Private 
Investment57
                                                          
56 Names and layout of the table have been changed for consistency as Xiaoyang referred to the Eximbank credits as 
‘the framework agreement’ and the GRN as Cabinet of NR in the table. 
, which requires that 70 percent of the labor force is Angolan. Companies working 
for governmental projects are not subject to this rule, and are directly controlled by the Ministry 
of Finance or other corresponding ministries. The exception is made under the consideration that: 
“national reconstruction projects such as water supply and road construction are urgently needed 
for Angolan’s daily life and should be finished as soon as possible; while other projects, such as 
power plants and telecom, require large number of skilled technicians, which Angola cannot 
provide for the time being” (Xiaoyang 2010:353). So, only the companies that work under the 
official credit line are exempted from this rule, and when they move on to private projects in 
Angola, they must again follow this rule. It is not known what conditions the GRN projects have, 
but the table suggests that they operate under the same exemption that the Eximbank-credit does. 
57 Agência Nacional para o Investimento Privado in Portuguese. 
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 This shows that the amount of Angolan workers on Chinese projects may increase with 
time. However, there is a lack of local industry to supply the construction sector in Angola. The 
low profit margins that Chinese companies operate under seem to hinder an extended use of local 
content because they cannot afford expensive local subcontractors and personnel. According to 
Corkin “Angolan companies are now sourcing Chinese construction materials because they are 
more freely available and at lower cost” (Corkin 2008a:183). Skilled Angolans are scarce due to 
the prolonged civil war, and the ones that have the right education are so in-demand that their 
wages are too high for Chinese companies that by far do not pay the same wages as Western 
companies (Xiaoyang 2010:358).  The lack of joint ventures will make it challenging for Chinese 
companies to contribute to technological transfer. Corkin state that: “Currently, little evidence 
exists to suggest that Chinese companies will enter into joint venture partnership with Angolan 
firms beyond contracting Angolan site-workers” (Corkin 2008a:184). According to Corkin this is 
not only due to the low local skill base, but also because of the language barrier. The most 
common second-language in China is English, and it is not common for Angolans to be fluent in 
English. This is a challenge as Angolan companies usually don’t have the capacity to execute 
large-scale infrastructure projects. Prior to the 2004 Chinese credit, the Angolan construction 
sector was dominated by large Portuguese firms. Both Brazilian and Portuguese firms had usually 
been supported and secured by oil-backed loans of approximately US$300-500 million. China’s 
entrance has thus according to Corkin, to a certain degree displaced traditional foreign 
commercial interests rather than Angolan companies (Corkin 2008a:172).    
        
Chinese construction companies 
In Luanda it is difficult not to notice the influx of Chinese construction companies and workers. 
The guesthouse where I stayed was built by Chinese workers, maintenance work was done by 
Chinese workers at the Catholic University, and we often drove past Chinese construction sites. 
Corkin suggests that without the Chinese credit-lines it would have been difficult for the first 
Chinese companies to establish themselves in Angola. Angola is known to be a challenging 
country to do business in, and is rated 168 out of 181 in the World Bank ease of ‘doing business’ 
list. “There is little wonder therefore that most Chinese construction companies’ entry into 
Angola’s market has been through a tightly managed high-level bilateral agreement between the 
61 
 
Angolan government and China Exim Bank or CIF” (Corkin 2011:177).  
 Because previous studies of Sino-Angolan relations have mainly focused on oil; there is 
little information available to measure the accomplishment of Chinese construction companies. 
The establishments of Chinese construction companies are taking for granted by some scholars 
when considering the large numbers of Chinese companies and workers that have established 
themselves on Angola during a short period of time.  A few studies have focused on Chinese 
construction firms in Africa in general (Corkin et al. 2008; Chen et al. 2007), or in other African 
countries (Chen 2009), but the focus in Angola has mainly been in the oil sector, with the 
exception of Corkin 2008a and Xiaoyang 2010.      
 Chinese construction companies in Africa are known to be cheaper than construction 
companies from other countries. Chinese workers usually live on-site, and work long days all 
week. Chinese construction companies pay less than other foreign companies, and import the 
bulk materials from China. As Corkin et al. notes: “while local and foreign construction 
companies operate on profit margins of 15-25 percent, Chinese companies usually operate on 
margins of under 10 percent, thereby making them extremely competitive on price” (Corkin et al. 
2008:5). Chinese construction companies have a long history in Africa, but not in Angola. The 
established position that Chinese companies have gotten in Angola is evident in all the 
subcontracts they get: “Chinese companies are subcontracted by companies from all countries 
because of their competitive prices” (Xiaoyang 2010). According to Brautigam, there have been 
incidents where work subcontracted to Angolan companies is actually executed by a Chinese 
company in the end. This happens because Angolan companies have in an interesting twist 
subcontracted the job to another Chinese company.58
 
According to Corkin, over 20 Chinese 
companies established a ‘Chamber of Commerce for Chinese Companies in Angola in 2006, 
indicating that the companies viewed their presence in Angola as long-term. The Chinese 
compnies consisted mostly of construction companies, but also Chinese NOCs participates. 
According to her research, Chinese firms anticipate that they will secure more contracts once they 
are established in Angola (Corkin 2008a).        
    
 
                                                          
58 Interview with Deborah Brautigam, Researcher at American University in Washington, 13/5 2011 
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5.6. What does the ‘Angola mode’ mean for China’s access to Angola’s resources?  
Year  NOC? What Who? 
2004 Yes 50 percent stake in block 18 Sonangol Sinopec 
International (SSI) 
2005 No 25 percent stake in block 3(05) and 3(05a) China Sonangol 
International Holding 
2006 Yes 20 percent stake in block 15/6 Sonangol Sinopec 
International (SSI) 
2006 Yes 27,5 percent in block 17/06 Sonangol Sinopec 
Internationa (SSI) 
2006 Yes 40 percent in block 18/06 Sonangol Sinopec 
International (SSI) 
2006 Yes Agreement to develop a refinery Sonangol and Sinopec 
2007 Yes Refinery deal fell through Sonangol and Sinopec 
2009 Yes Sonangol blocked the purchase of a 20 percent stake in 
block 32 
Sinopec and CNOOC 
won the bid, but 
Sonangol blocked the 
transaction 
2011  No 10-15 percent stake in block 19, 20,36 and 38 China Sonangol 
International Holding 
  Table five: Chinese oil acquisition in Angola59
 
 
China Sonangol International Holding (CSIH) is a joint venture owned 70 percent by the group of 
private Chinese investors that extended the CIF credit, and 30 percent by Sonangol. This venture 
was according to Alves created in 2004 to expand the Hong Kong groups energy projects in 
Angola, and to allow Sonangol to access funding (Alves 2010:28). This cooperation is between 
Sonangol, and Chinese private investors, and is not a Chinese state-owned enterprise. CSIH did 
gain oil equity the same year as they extended the CIF credit (2005). However, this is not a 
Chinese state-owned company, so it cannot be used to argue that China has gained access to oil 
equity just because Chinese investors have. Nevertheless, this points to a direct link, formal or 
informal between the extending of Chinese credits, official or not, and the acquisition of oil 
equity in 2004 and 2005. The oil environment continued to be friendly to Chinese state-owned 
companies until the refinery deal fell through in 2007. Since then Sonangol has blocked attempts 
by Chinese NOCs at acquiring additional oil equity. However, the Chinese private investor 
venture with Sonangol has had recent success in acquiring stakes in four additional blocks.  
  Several scholars argue that the lack of oil equity gain by Chinese NOCs after the 
                                                          
59 Oil acquisition from 2005 to 2009 from Alves 2010. 2011oil acquisition from Macauhub (2011) 
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initial success of 2004 point to a ‘souring of relations’ or a ‘changed relationship’ (Corkin 2011; 
Alves 2010). However, there is no evidence that access to Angolan oil equity was a part of the 
‘resource for infrastructure’ contracts in Angola, only strong indications.     
 Acquisitions of oil equity in Angola, as in other countries, are highly political. According 
to Downs, more than three quarters of the World’s oil reserves are closed to foreign equity 
investments. African oil producers have been open to investment in exploration and production at 
a time when ‘other countries are reasserting state control over their oil industries’ (Downs 
2007:45). This makes the African market especially important if acquiring oil equity is a goal. 
There is also a wish amongst oil-dependent countries to diversify away from the volatile Middle 
East region (Obi 2010:181).          
 Even though African oil producers remain open to acquisitions, it does not mean that they 
don’t exert any control over ownership. In Angola, Sonangol has the right of first refusal, giving 
the company influence whenever a stake is sold. Securing oil supplies can be done by both 
ownership of oil equity, and by long-term contracts. While ownership of oil equity is preferable, 
it is challenging to achieve in foreign countries. Chinese National Oil Companies (NOC), the 
main ones established in the 1980s (Sinopec, CNOOC and CNPC), are not perceived to be very 
competitive internationally: “Chinese decision-makers are painfully aware of the inferior prowess 
of their oil firms on the global stage. They possess neither the bountiful reserves of the NOCs of 
oil producing states nor the technical expertise, financial weight and business savvy of European 
and American IOCs” (Soares de Oliveira 2008:87). Thus to acquire overseas oil equity, which 
according to Soares de Oliveira is a stated goal in China’s energy security policy, China has to 
find other ways of presenting their companies as attractive partners in the oil business. The oil for 
infrastructure deal has been viewed by several scholars as a method not only to supply China 
with oil, but also to secure China more oil equity (Alves 2010).    
 However, this did not last long as Chinese NOCs unsuccessfully tried to acquire more oil 
equity. Alves writes that: “Several blocks that various Chinese national oil companies had shown 
interest in were denied them”. She further suggests that while this may be due to the lack of 
technical expertise by the Chinese NOCs, it clearly sends a strong political message to Beijing. 
This stands in stark contrast to the favorable oil equity environment that met the Chinese NOCs 
in the aftermath of the first oil for infrastructure credit-line: “By comparing the smooth 
acquisition of the relinquished stake in bloc 18 in 2004 with the strains Sinopec is now facing 
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with the ongoing bidding for Marathon’s relinquished stake in bloc 32, one can see that the main 
difference is that Sonangol is no longer on Sinopec’s side” (Alves 2010:24). Sonangol is, as 
previously mentioned closely linked with the Angolan elite. She further points out that it is 
unclear whether this is due to Sinopec’s withdrawal from the Sonaref project, or because 
Sonangol is trying to protect the market and steer clear of a decline in oil prices. It is also a 
possibility that pragmatic concerns of the inexperience of the Chinese NOCs are driving the 
decision to block Sinopec. According to Corkin:“Angola is balancing the need to retain China 
Exim Bank as a financing partner with denying the less experienced Chinese national oil 
companies access to exploration blocks that they cannot operate” (Corkin 2011:4). This shows 
that the lack of technical expertise on the Chinese side may be hindering the acquisition of more 
oil equity for the Chinese NOCs. Sonangol and Sinopec also signed a partnership agreement in 
2006 to develop a refinery together that was supposed to be built in Lobito in 2010. However, in 
2007, the cooperation fell through and Sonangol decided to continue with the project without 
Sinopec. Corkin suggests that this could be due to disagreements over which markets the refinery 
should supply. Technical differences limit the destination to Asian or Western standards. 
Angola’s main objective with the refinery was for domestic use; hence, the oil could not be 
shipped to Asia (Corkin 2011). Alves suggests that the main issue was not the question of supply 
destination; rather, it was because profit prospects were low for Sinopec. She writes that:”The 
project failed because of strictly business consideration that set the Chinese and Angolan interests 
apart” (Alves 2010:19-20). Further, in 2008, Sinopec in cooperation with China National 
Offshore Oil Cooperation put in a bid for a 20% stake relinquished in bloc 32. The offer outbid 
the other offers, and the deal was expected to close by the end of 2009. However, Sonangol 
blocked the access for the Chinese companies by announcing that they would exercise its right of 
first refusal. Alves suggests that the reason was that the market was not good enough and 
Sonangol expected to sell the stake at a higher price later. Nevertheless, her source also admitted 
that political considerations could change the picture (Alves 2010:21).     
  In spite of a lack of success in gaining more oil equity, Alves emphasizes that the 
accomplishments are impressive if one considers the timeframe as Chinese NOCs are completely 
novel players in the Angolan oil sector (Alves 2010:21). Vines et al. also emphasizes that China 
has been fairly successful when comparing the entrance of Chinese NOCs in the Angolan oil 
market with other Asian latecomers. India has unsuccessfully tried to enter the Angolan oil-
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market in the same period, and a Japanese NOC with longer experience in Angola has only 
managed to get hold of minor stakes (Vines et al. 2009). However successful Chinese NOCs have 
been considering the timeframe, it is clear that the initial success of 2004-6 has not been a 
continuing trend. This is summarized by Vines et al.:“despite China’s efforts, to enter the oil 
sector, production is still dominated by Western companies” (Vines et al. 2009:56). However, the 
recent success of the private China Sonangol International Holding in acquiring oil equity raise 
new questions regarding the details of the resources for infrastructure negotiations. Nevertheless, 
I argue that the connection between Chinese NOCs acquiring oil equity and the official Chinese 
credit-line remain speculations. After all, the lack of additional oil equity for Chinese NOCs did 
not stop the Chinese Eximbank from extending more credit through the ‘resource for 
infrastructure’ mechanism.         
 To sum up, there is no comprehensive overview over all of the completed projects, even 
though it is easy to find lists of contracted projects up until 2008. It is difficult to say how many 
projects that have actually been implemented to date. However, we do know that according to the 
Ministry of Finance, 118 Eximbank projects have been completed in the areas of health, 
education, energy, agriculture, fisheries, transport, post and telecommunication and public works 
since 2004. While more projects have probably been completed, we also know that there have 
been problems with the CIF projects. In 2008, over $2.5 billion of the Eximbank credit had been 
used, and there were over 100 Chinese companies in Angola, and 40 000 Chinese workers were 
employed by Chinese companies under the official Chinese credit-line. In the previous section I 
sketched the development of the Chinese resources for infrastructure contracts in Angola since 
2004, and applied energy security and win-win perspectives to analyze the oil gains for China, 
and the infrastructure gains for Angola. It seems that the resource for infrastructure mechanism is 
a conjuncture in time, dependent on the stage of development for the country that use natural 
resources as collateral/repayment. What we have seen is that China’s strategy has not changed, 
while Angola’s has, and Angola may be outgrowing this mode of financing. So, how has this 
mode of financing played out in other African countries’ that has negotiated resources for 
infrastructure contracts? 
5.9 How does the ‘Angola-mode’ compare to other oil-for infrastructure credits in Africa? 
It seems like the extreme case of oil for infrastructure engagement, Angola, is actively seeking 
other modes of finance that is not backed by oil. This is probably because they now have the 
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option, as opposed to in 2004 where there were few creditors willing to lend Angola money 
without any oil-security. While the official Chinese credit was offered at a very good rate, it was 
still 1.5 percent over Libor. The assumption made by the World Bank study (Foster et al. 2009) is 
that this is a model that is increasingly used in resource rich African countries. But how do these 
mechanisms compare? Are we talking about the same model? Are these credits a mechanism to 
secure Chinese access to natural resources? In this section I will draw on the experiences of the 
other African countries with experiences from oil for infrastructure engagement with China. I 
will use this as a basis to discuss potential patterns concerning these contracts. In this process I 
will also explore the external validity of the Angolan case. The countries are: Nigeria, Sudan and 
Congo-Brazzaville. As there is little information available on the oil for infrastructure contracts 
that have been negotiated in these countries, a thorough comparison of all the relevant 
dimensions is not possible. However, I will focus on the second part of my research question, if 
this has been a mechanism to secure Chinese access to African oil in these countries, or if it is a 
mechanism to ensure mutual benefit.  
5.9.1 Oil for infrastructure in Nigeria 
Sino-Nigerian relations have some of the same trademarks as Sino-Angolan relations. Nigeria is, 
and was, also in ‘dire need’ of functioning infrastructure, from railways to gas pipelines. It is 
also, like Angola, a country with large oil reserves. There has also been an exponential trade 
growth between China and Nigeria, extensive Chinese migration and high-level political visits 
between the two countries (Wong 2009:28). In Nigeria, Asian NOC’s (China, Japan, South Korea 
and India) were invited by then president Olusegun Obasanjo to acquire oil blocks in exchange 
for infrastructure development in 2005. The proposal was thus a Nigerian initiative, and was not 
only offered to China, but also to other Asian NOCs. In comparison to Angola where there is no 
evidence of the credit being directly linked with oil equity acquisition, this was a stated part of 
the agreement in Nigeria. In exchange for oil equity for Asian NOCs, infrastructure would be 
developed and financed by Asian countries. In contrast to other national oil companies around the 
world, Nigeria’s state-owned oil company, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC), has ‘always welcomed foreign equity participation’, and that’s why IOC’s own 98 % of 
Nigeria’s oil reserves (Wong 2009:10). 2005 was the first year that Asian NOCs participated in a 
licensing round in Nigeria. South Korea, India, Taiwan and Malaysia all entered into strategic 
deals with president Obasanjo that offered lucrative blocks for strategic investments. Right of 
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first refusal was introduced, favoring the Asian NOCs that had already negotiated deals 
beforehand to the annoyance of Western oil companies.  This was offered reportedly because 
President Obasanjo was ‘fed up with the Shells and Exxons’ that had repeatedly declined to build 
new refineries, on grounds of cost, or to otherwise invest in job-creating projects outside their 
core business” (Wong 2009:14).          
 In 2006, the Chinese NOC China National Offshore Oil Cooperation (CNOOC) bought 
contractor rights in a ‘lucrative block’, OML 130 on the Akpo field. This was China’s first oil 
acquisition in Nigeria, and it was followed by a $1.6 billion loan from the Chinese Eximbank to 
CNOOC to develop the field (Wong 2009:19). During three bidding rounds, Chinese NOCs 
secured oil blocks in return for commitments of rehabilitation of a refinery, the construction of a 
railway, and a hydroelectric power station (Mthembu-Salter 2009). However, when President 
Obasanjo left office in 2007, his successor President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua reversed or 
cancelled many of the projects implemented by the former president, including the ‘oil for 
infrastructure projects’. According to Mthembu-Salter:  
“The new government has cited a variety of concerns, but the key issues are that it wants to trade 
oil blocks for cash and not infrastructure, and that the new political elite will delay infrastructure 
projects, no matter how important, until its members (rather than its predecessors) receive the 
bulk of the benefit.”(Mthembu-Salter 2009). 
There has been no result in the ground of the physical infrastructure negotiated through the oil for 
infrastructure deals, and they were reversed with the new government. The oil for infrastructure 
mechanism seems to have failed miserably in Nigeria. If this mechanism is not working in one of 
the countries with the most important natural resource for China, why is that?  
 Some scholars have suggested that the lack of success in Nigeria as opposed to Angola is 
related to power alternation. Is the ‘Angola mode’ limited to regimes without turnover? Could the 
model be dependent on lack of power alternation? While the same political party was in power in 
Nigeria during both the negotiations and the collapse, term limits of four years had new players 
changing the playing field. Chinese NOCs and the Chinese Eximbank experienced that when the 
governments change, so does their business partners. The attractiveness of stable political 
regimes is underscored by Mthembu-Salter, “If ‘oil for infrastructure’ agreements are secured 
between African governments and Chinese investors, the latter should take into account the 
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possibility of substantive renegotiation or even cancellation in the event of a change of 
government” (Mthembu-Salter 2009:1). According to Alves, the attractiveness of the Angolan oil 
industry rests on low operational costs, high exploration success rate, and the suitability of 
Angolan oil for China’s refining complex. Further, there are prospects for stability in the oil 
industry.  The stable political environment is reinforced by the new constitution of 2010 that 
enable President dos Santos to remain in power till 2020 (Alves 2010b:4).    
 As the oil producing country in sub-Saharan Africa with the largest reserves of oil, 
Nigeria would be a prime target for the resource for infrastructure mechanism if the intent was to 
secure oil equity/oil supply. Yet, this has failed in Nigeria as opposed to in Angola. Mthembu-
Salter suggests that this is because the Chinese oil-for infrastructure model is not compatible with 
the power alternation in the Nigerian government. Wong suggests that:“The oil-for-infrastructure 
concept has succeeded elsewhere in Africa. But in Nigeria it was poorly conceived and poorly 
implemented- and above all, it was distorted by political considerations” (Wong 2009:28). 
 Rather than being dependent on lack of power alternation, I will argue that these 
mechanisms are dependent on predictability. There is regular turnover in a democracy, but that 
does not make it common to cancel contracts negotiated by the previous government. A regime 
built on patronage and clientilism would need to satisfy a new group of friends that helped them 
to power in a turnover situation. Contracts negotiated may have benefitted friends of the former 
government. Wong argues that the Nigerian case is not an example that illustrates any aggressive 
pursuit of African oil: “This has not been a case of the aggressive Asian pursuit of oil.” (Wong et 
al. 2009:28). There is no doubt that China is seeking to secure a supply of oil, and that they 
encourage Chinese NOCs to acquire oil equity. It is however doubtful as to if the resource for 
infrastructure mechanism is a method proposed by China to achieve this.    
 In comparison with the Angolan case, the Nigerian case was contingent on Chinese NOCs 
acquiring oil equity. This is a crucial difference between these contracts in Nigeria and Angola. 
Interestingly, the oil equity part was proposed by Nigeria. Even though agreements were 
cancelled it did not exclude Chinese companies from participating in the Nigerian oil field. The 
China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation for example bought the Canadian company Addax, 
which had substantial Nigerian oil assets in 2009 (Mthembu-Salter 2009). Chinese NOCs are not 
dependent on oil for infrastructure deals to buy the way into more oil equity. As a mechanism to 
secure natural resources, the case of Nigeria shows that the oil equity part was proposed by the 
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Nigerian side, not only to China, but to other Asian countries as well. In this deal, the oil equity 
was publicly a part of the deal. This stand in comparison to Angola where assumptions of oil 
equity agreements have been made based on ‘coincidences’ of credit extension and oil equity 
acquisitions. The Chinese credits to Nigeria have been used to construct the argument that China 
offers credits to gain access to African resources. Still, it was Nigeria that used access to 
resources to get Asian countries to invest in infrastructure construction as the Western IOCs 
declined to do so. This does not fit into the picture of China as the driving force in the 
relationship between China and African states.  
5.9.2 Oil for infrastructure in Sudan and Congo-Brazzaville  
Can Sudan and Congo-Brazzaville shed light on the resources for infrastructure mechanism? The 
president of Sudan, Omar Hassan al-Bashir came to power through a military coup in 1989 and 
has ruled ever since. Sino-Sudan relations are probably the ones that have been most widely 
criticized by Western media. CNPC started to export oil from Sudan in 1999. China has assisted 
Sudan with oil infrastructure (not the same as oil for infrastructure) including the construction of 
an oil pipeline to the Red Sea, and an oil refinery (Obi 2010:184). According to Foster et al., 
China (through the Eximbank) has financed close to $1.3 billion in infrastructure projects ranging 
from thermal generating capacity to rail and water sectors (Foster et al. 2009). Of these $1.3 
billion, they could only identify oil for infrastructure agreements in one instance. This was a 
project in 2001 amounting $128 million dollars. Oil was used as collateral for the loans in the 
first two phases. Credit was used to construct the El-Gaili power plant, and the project is 
completed.  (Foster et al. 2009:57). Oil for infrastructure has thus not been the dominating pattern 
of infrastructure financing in Sudan. Rather, Eximbank loans that were not secured by oil were 
more common. Chinese NOCs has been quite successful in acquiring oil equity in Sudan. 
Acquiring oil equity is not usually as easy as it was for Chinese NOCs in Sudan: “The early 
success in the Sudan in acquiring such oil may have vetted Chinese companies, but it has become 
clear that equity oil in the form of concessional agreements granted to a foreign oil company is a 
rarity” (Lee and Shalmon 2008:132).         
 It is not possible to find any official links between the acquirement of oil equity and the 
Eximbank resource for infrastructure loans. However, the existence of Chinese credit may have 
created political goodwill towards Chinese investors. The ease in acquiring oil equity may also be 
because there was little competition in Sudan. Western oil companies withdrew from Sudan due 
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to increased domestic pressure and US sanctions against the Sudanese government for human 
rights violations.           
 The President of Congo-Brazzaville, Denis Sassou Nguesso is one of Africa's longest-
serving leaders. 16 percent of China’s oil imports from Africa were from Congo-Brazzaville in 
2006. According to the World Bank the building of the Congo River Dam was backed by crude 
oil guarantees. This was financed by a $280 million credit and is completed. There is a lack of 
information of the oil for infrastructure deal in Congo-Brazzaville, but the existing information 
suggests that it is limited. The small projects in both Sudan and Congo-Brazzaville gave little oil 
supply for the money. And again, why would they use this mechanism to secure oil if it could be 
bought for the same price at the international market?      
  Angola, Sudan and Congo-Brazzaville have had the same leader during both the 
negotiations and the implementation of the resource for infrastructure mechanisms. While the 
mechanisms have been much smaller in size and scope in Sudan and Congo-Brazzaville than in 
Angola, it has nevertheless been completed. In Nigeria on the other hand, leaders were changed, 
and the resource for infrastructure deals were cancelled. On this background it is possible to 
construct the following hypothesis: 
The oil for infrastructure mechanism is contingent on political predictability to be implemented. 
Both stable democracies and stable authoritarian regimes have predictability. Even if there is 
turnover in a democracy, you would not expect the government to not uphold agreements made 
with the previous government. In a regime with turnover, but with extended corruption the new 
government may have different groups they need to cater to. Perhaps contracts were awarded to 
companies that were owned by friends of the former president.      
 This is a hypothesis limited to countries that use oil to secure Chinese infrastructure 
credit. It is possible to imagine that oil gives African countries better bargaining power than other 
natural resources that have been used to secure Chinese credits such as cocoa (Ghana)60
                                                          
60 Ghana has finished negotiating a new, large credit line from the Eximbank and CDB where some repayments will 
be in the form of exports, possibly oil (SOURCE!) 
. This 
shows that some dimensions of the Angolan resources for infrastructure mechanism (contingent 
on predictability) may have validity outside of Angola. However, using the case of Angola for 
further generalizations will only be fruitful when comparable cases are taken into account. Other 
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dimensions of the resources for infrastructure mechanisms in Angola were quite different from 
the other oil for infrastructure countries, and are potential sources of error.    
  What make these contracts different in different settings may be the individual 
African countries as negotiations are bilateral. Brautigam suggests that individual African 
countries rather than China will decide the impact of Chinese engagement: “the developmental 
impact of Chinese aid and economic cooperation will almost certainly vary country by country 
and sector by sector. The deciding factor is likely not to be China, but individual African 
countries and their governments” (Brautigam 2009:21). This stands in contrast to the picture of 
African countries as passive players in Sino-African relations. The type of resource may also 
have an impact. According to Alden and Alves, there is a difference between oil and other 
resources: “The fact that the Chinese are latecomers seems to be more of a hindrance in the oil 
sector than in minerals, seeing as Chinese companies have accessed major deals in the latter 
sector (e.g. in Gabon, the DRC and Zambia) in a shorter time frame (Alves and Alden 2009:16). 
The comparison between Nigeria and Angola show that there are quite different dynamics at play 
in cases one could expect would be more similar regarding the resource for infrastructure 
mechanism. The resource for infrastructure mechanism seems quite country specific in their 
differences.     
5.10 Comparing theoretical perspectives 
I will now explore the hypotheses from chapter two, using the indicators from the previously 
discussed oil and infrastructure engagement in Angola to analyze the assumptions of the 
hypotheses. Building on the dependency/energy security perspective we have H1: The 'Angola 
mode' is a mechanism to secure a steady supply of natural resources to China from Africa. An 
underlying assumption of this perspective is that the use of Chinese construction firms is mainly 
to mitigate risks: The use of Chinese construction firms is used to minimize the exposure to risks 
such as local corruption and labor costs. We also have the underlying assumption that: Angola is 
a passive player in this relationship. Building on the win-win perspective we have H2: The 
resource for infrastructure contracts is a mechanism to secure contracts for Chinese companies 
and infrastructure development for Angola. In this hypothesis we also have some underlying 
assumptions: Oil is used to mitigate the risk of extending a credit to a country with poor credit 
ratings and both China and Angola gains from this arrangement.    
 In Chapter 2 (2.10) I outlined some expectations of what indicators one would expect to 
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find to support H1 and H2. To support H1, an important indicator concerns oil gains for China. 
This could be in the form of oil equity for Chinese NOCs, or agreements of a steady oil supply to 
China. We would also expect that Chinese construction firms leave after a short period, and earn 
little profit as they are primarily used to mitigate risk. In addition we would expect to find mainly 
state-owned companies, and that Chinese companies mainly employ Chinese workers. The 
Angolan government would also be passive players in this relationship. According to H2 we 
would expect to find some quite different indicators in Angola. We would find that Chinese 
companies are established in Angola because of this credit. We would also find evidence to 
support the notion that oil is used to mitigate the risk of extending credit instead of oil being the 
primary reason for the contracts. Last, we would expect that both China and Angola has achieved 
mutual benefit from this arrangement. I will primarily focus on internal indicators in Angola, but 
I will also present external indicators from the case of Nigeria (and to a smaller degree Sudan and 
Congo-Brazzaville) to elaborate on the hypotheses where suitable. The indicators will be 
examined in the following order; oil equity and oil supply gains for China, the role of Chinese 
construction companies, the role of the Angolan government in negotiations, if oil is used to 
mitigate risks, and if there has been mutual benefit for China and Angola.     
       
Oil equity and oil supply gains for China 
In Angola there was a coincidence of oil equity gains by Chinese NOCs and the extension of the 
first Chinese oil-backed credit in 2004. This laid ground for speculations that the Chinese oil-
backed credits were directly linked with oil acquisition by Chinese NOCs. However, one problem 
with this assumption is that the success of Chinese NOCs in Angola has not continued after 2006. 
The refinery deal fell through in 2007, and Sonangol blocked the purchase of further oil blocks 
for Chinese NOCs Sinopec and CNOOC in 2009. Even though Chinese NOCS were blocked 
from oil equity acquisition by Sonangol, the Eximbank continued to extend further credit to 
Angola in 2010, and other Chinese actors such as the CDB and the ICBC have extended credits 
to Angola. It may be that there was an initial linking of oil equity and the resources for 
infrastructure contracts, but this connection does not seem to present anymore, nor are there any 
publicly available documents or statements that supports this from the Angolan or the Chinese 
side. While Chinese NOCs, have accomplished less in terms of oil equity the recent years, the 
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Chinese private-owned joint venture with Sonangol (CSIH) has had recent success acquiring oil 
equity. It may be that the private owned CIF has linked its credits on oil equity acquisition, but 
the opaqueness of the CIF contracts hinders further insight in this. The difference between CIF 
and the Chinese Eximbank are important to uphold. As there is no evidence that the private 
investors behind the CIF group are directly connected to the Chinese government, it is not fruitful 
to operate on the assumption that both CIF and the Eximbank answer to an elaborate plan by the 
Chinese government. It is argued that while China’s oil equity gains may have been limited, 
China did manage to secure a steady supply of oil. Assuming that crude oil is supplied to Chinese 
refineries and then sold it is clear that China did indeed manage to secure a steady supply of oil. 
However, as this is sold at market price, the gains of securing crude oil in this manner are 
dubious. Why not just buy the crude oil at the international market for the same price?  
 When looking at external indicators as presented in resources for infrastructure contacts in 
Nigeria, Sudan and Congo-Brazzaville, we do not see the contours of the exact same model. In 
the Nigerian case, oil equity was directly connected to infrastructure development, but the deal 
was cancelled by the following president.  In Congo-Brazzaville and Sudan the contracts were 
used to finance one project and are thus not directly securing a steady supply of oil, or connected 
directly to oil equity. However, it is possible to argue that such contracts also serve the purpose of 
creating political goodwill to facilitate oil acquisition so there could be an indirect link between 
these contracts and oil acquisition by Chinese NOCs. Nonetheless, as seen in Nigeria, Chinese 
NOCs has a better tactic to acquire oil equity than such through such complicated mechanisms: 
purchasing other oil companies with strategically important assets.     
 H1 was a more probable explanation in 2004 than it is in the aftermath of Sonangol 
denying purchase of oil equity by Chinese NOCs. Likewise, H2 is not capturing the ‘coincidence’ 
of Chinese NOCs gaining Angolan oil equity for the first time right after the extension of the oil-
backed Eximbank credit in 2004. In Nigeria, Chinese NOCs gained no oil equity through the 
mechanism because the deal was cancelled. However, it did not hinder a Chinese NOC from 
buying an oil company that had important assets in Nigeria and gain oil equity in a more 
traditional way. Initially, the Nigerian case support H1 as it was clear that oil access and 
infrastructure construction was linked. Be that as it may, the Nigerian case was the only case 
examined where there was a direct, public linking with Chinese acquisition of oil equity in 
exchange for infrastructure construction, and it failed. 
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The role of Chinese construction companies         
Low margins of profit and the amount of Chinese workers support the argument that the Chinese 
companies are mainly there to mitigate risks. The first companies that came to Angola were state-
owned, but now there are 50 state-owned and 400 private Chinese companies in Angola, so it is 
clear that we don’t mainly see Chinese state-owned companies in Angola. Chinese companies do 
bring own employees to a large extent, and the amount of Chinese workers are bigger on the 
projects financed by the Chinese Eximbank and the CIF. But is this really used as a method to 
secure oil?  The Chinese companies seem to be establishing a long-term presence in Angola. The 
fact that many companies stay in Angola and take on subcontracts outside of the Chinese credit 
lines support the notion that they are not only there to facilitate access to oil for China. The 
creation of the Chamber of Commerce for Chinese companies also supports the notion that the 
Chinese construction companies are not about to leave Angola. However, the Chinese Eximbank 
credit-line also seems to be established with a long-term perspective, so it is possible that they 
have a continued presence to go on mitigating risks. The presence and success of the Chinese 
construction companies in Angola support H2. H1 seem to be supported by the low margins of 
profit and the amount of Chinese workers. Nevertheless, the evidence for H2 seems much 
stronger concerning the role of Chinese construction companies. There are strong indicators 
suggesting that the Chinese Eximbank facilitated the entrance of the Chinese companies through 
the credit-lines such as the Chamber of Commerce, and the long-term perspective of the Chinese 
construction companies in Angola.     
Has the Angolan government been passive players in the negotiations? 
In Angola it is argued that the 30 percent of the Chinese Eximbank contracts that are reserved for 
Angolan companies is a large concession considering that the Eximbank credit is an export credit. 
However, it is not uncommon for foreign companies that use export-credit to subcontract to local 
suppliers. It is also indicated that the 30 percent reserved for the local industry is a victory on 
paper more than in practice. Nevertheless, it is indicated that Angola has by no means been a 
passive player in these negotiations. Externally we find that also in Nigeria the government 
played an active role in the negotiations. The Nigerian government proposed the agreement, and 
it did not seem like a consorted effort by China to gain inroads in the Nigerian oil industry as they 
reluctantly participated after a Nigerian initiative presented not only to Chinese NOCs, but also to 
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other Asian NOCs. This indicates that Sino-Angolan relations are not dominated by the ‘Chinese 
dragon’ and that Angola, as well as Nigeria have been actively negotiating instead of passively 
accepting terms imposed from the Chinese side. This does not support the H1 assumption that 
Angola has been passive players in negotiations with China. The evidence from Nigeria is also 
suggesting that they were not passive players in the resources for infrastructure mechanism. 
      
Has oil been used to mitigate risks? 
Did we find evidence that oil is used to mitigate risk? The additional Chinese financing that is not 
oil-backed indicate that oil may have been used to mitigate the risk of extending credit to a 
country in such a financial state that Angola experienced in 2004. Angola’s economic situation at 
the time limited all but oil-backed financing. China isn’t the only country that has required oil-
backing to extend credit to Angola, but oil-backed lending seems to have decreased as Angola 
has improved its financial situation. The oil-backing in the case of Angola may just be a security 
demanded by Sinosure to insure the export credits to Angola. The ‘secure oil supply’ to China is 
priced at market rate, which makes it necessary to ask what the Chinese gained from this 
mechanism in terms of oil supply that they could not have achieved through buying oil at the 
international market. But if it is not about the supply of resources, why go into the bother of 
making complicated resource for infrastructure contracts? Is it to promote Chinese export? Is it to 
facilitate market entrance? In Angola there is no doubt that the credit-lines have facilitated the 
establishment of Chinese construction companies. However, do the Chinese companies need 
these credits to establish themselves in Africa? Several indicators support the assumption in H2 
that the oil was used to mitigate the risks of extending credit to a country in a difficult economic 
situation. The Sinosure requirement and the fact that other agencies also demanded oil security 
from Angola to extend credit support this assumption. While the 2004 ‘coincidence’ of oil equity 
support H1, this has as earlier noted not continued to be the case.  
 
Has there been mutual benefit for China and Angola?  
Mutual benefit is a vague concept to assess. What lies in this statement? Both parts may have 
expected more from this engagement. Angola has gained a lot of infrastructure construction, but 
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does the cost outweigh the benefits?  It may be that China had expected continued preferential 
treatment for Chinese NOCs. The credit-lines are not used in full, and Angola has a huge ability 
to draw from existing credit-lines if they want to. While it is possible that the Chinese 
government expected more than they got for the resources for infrastructure contracts, over 400 
Chinese companies, and 60-70 000 Chinese workers in Angola are not insignificant. China’s 
official Africa policy presented through FOCAC and white papers are extensive as discussed in 
chapter two. However, as we have seen in chapter four and five. China’s dominant form of 
engagement with Angola has been oil and infrastructure development.  The limited amount of 
engagement outside the natural resource and construction sector points to a relationship that is for 
now limited to certain sectors. So does the small amount of Chinese FDI in Angola. There are no 
plans of a Special Economic Zones in Angola, even though it is China’s biggest trading partner. 
When China was in Angola’s position and engaged in oil for infrastructure contracts with Japan, 
China had a local industry and workers able to exploit such an arrangement. As this may not be 
the case in Angola, the long-term gains for Angola from this arrangement may be questionable. 
The low amount of local workers and lack of joint ventures with local companies on the CIF and 
Eximbank projects indicate that the benefit for Angola could have been higher. The quality of the 
Chinese projects are largely based on rumors, and while there may be some truth to it, there is 
little evidence that Chinese construction projects are decisively worse than for example Brazilian 
construction projects in Angola. It is indicated that there has been some mutual benefit in 
accordance with H2 as Angola has managed to obtain essential infrastructure in a range of sectors 
that Angola did not have the capacity to construct them. However, the long-term gains for Angola 
from this arrangement are not certain, and the lack of local participation and limited amount of 
technological transfer questions the long-term benefit for Angola. While the intentions from the 
Chinese government and the Chinese Eximbank may be good, Chinese companies, state-owned 
and private, are the ones that in the end execute the policies, and they are primarily driven by 
profit rather than concerns of ‘mutual benefit’.  
   
Which perspective has been most fruitful to use to analyze empirical evidence?  
While H1 seemed like a plausible hypothesis in 2004, developments since then have changed the 
landscape. H1 fails to capture why Chinese NOCs has not continued to gain more oil equity in 
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Angola. The Chinese resources for infrastructure mechanism have not stopped as a result of this. 
In fact, China continues to offer financing to Angola through new agencies as the credit-line 
extended by the CDB and the loan from the ICBC demonstrate.  This indicates that the 2004 
coincidence of oil equity and the Chinese Eximbank credit may have been a moment in time. 
When using H1 to analyze the resources for infrastructure contracts, the focus on oil equity 
acquisition/long-term oil supply overlooks alternative explanations to the oil component in the 
mechanism such as the Sinosure requirement of additional guarantees for insuring credit to 
countries with poor credit. The Chinese Eximbank need insurance from Sinosure, and is therefore 
unable to provide credit to countries with poor credit without additional guarantees. Acquisition 
of oil equity was not as far as publicly known part of the resource for infrastructure contracts. 
Therefore, the declining success in gaining oil equity does not really say anything about the 
viability of the resource for infrastructure contracts. Further financing from China that is not 
backed by oil confirms this assumption that Angola is evolving from the moment when oil-
backed loans was all they could obtain. There may have been some initial linking of Chinese 
NOCs acquiring oil equity, however, if so, it has not continued to be the case, and it does not 
seem to be an essential part of the resource for infrastructure mechanism in Angola today. 
 While H2 explains the establishment of Chinese construction companies in Angola in line 
with China’s official ‘go out’ policy, this hypothesis fails to capture potential challenges 
concerning the amount of Chinese workers in Angola, and the lack of technological transfer. The 
exemptions provided to Chinese companies for projects financed by the Chinese Eximbank and 
CIF credits may go both ways. While this is possibly an efficient method to ensure rapid 
infrastructure construction that may remove essential infrastructure challenges, concerns are 
raised at the lack of local content and technological transfer. This is a trend that may change as 
Chinese companied continue to participate in the Angolan construction sector outside of the CIF 
and the Eximbank credits. If all projects are supervised by ANIP instead of getting special rules 
from state agencies, the content of local labor in projects executed by Chinese companies are 
likely to be higher, and the gains for Angola will increase.        
 Taking into account the lack of further oil equity gains, and that the oil reserved for China 
through this arrangement is sold at market price I argue that the indicators from the empirical 
evidence support H2 rather than H1. It is indicated that the Chinese construction companies are 
establishing in Angola as a result of the resources for infrastructure mechanism, and important 
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infrastructure projects in several sectors in Angola has been completed through this arrangement. 
However this does not mean that H2 captures all the dimensions of Sino-Angolan engagement. 
H2 fails to capture pitfalls with the large infrastructure projects such as the limited amount of 
technical transfer and quality of the completed projects. Oil is important for China, and Chinese 
NOCs actively seek both oil equity and long-term supply. However, in Angola, it does not seem 
like the resources for infrastructure contracts have provided Chinese NOCs with substantial oil 
gains except for in the initial phase. 
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Chapter six – conclusion 
 
6. 1 Concluding remarks 
In this thesis I have investigated the Chinese resources for infrastructure mechanism in Angola. I 
chose Angola as a case due to the size and scope of the resources for infrastructure mechanism in 
Angola, and because oil is China’s largest external reliance. Because the Chinese resource for 
infrastructure mechanism was so much more evident in Angola than in other African countries 
that had engaged in this mechanism I argued that Angola was an extreme case. This was 
particularly important to explore the second part of the research question. If the resources for 
infrastructure contracts are used to secure Chinese access to natural resources, one would expect 
to see this at play in oil-rich Angola where this mechanism has been the largest of size and scope 
of all the African countries that China has engaged in this arrangement with. Similarly, if this has 
been a mechanism to ensure mutual benefit, we would expect to see evidence of this in Angola. I 
also drew on indicators taken from other countries that have engaged in oil for infrastructure 
agreements with China, allowing me to explore the external validity of Angola, and collect 
additional external indicators concerning the resources for infrastructure mechanism. This shed 
additional light on the country-specific differences in the use of the resources for infrastructure 
mechanism. Like this mechanism was a moment in time for China, it may be a moment in time 
for Angola as well. The resource for infrastructure contracts seems to be relevant in a certain 
conjuncture between countries at different stages of development.  However, comparing with 
other cases you find that the mechanism is not automatically universal. I argued that Nigeria was 
in the same conjuncture as Angola. Nigeria initiated negotiations, needed infrastructure, and had 
the oil to pay for it. This laid the basis for a new hypothesis: ‘The oil for infrastructure 
mechanism is contingent on political predictability to be implemented.’   The lack of success in 
Nigeria underscores the limitation of this conjuncture model, and of using the resources for 
infrastructure contracts in Angola to generalize over comparable contracts between China and 
African countries.            
 This study has demonstrated that Angola alone is not a good case to use to generalize over 
Sino-African relations. Of the countries that have engaged in resource for infrastructure 
mechanisms with China, Angola is often used to illustrate this engagement. As an extreme case 
of one mode of Sino-African engagement, it can be a source of many incorrect assumptions of 
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Sino-African engagement in general. Angola is neither a miniature Africa, nor a representative 
case. Using Angola to generalize in other cases where China is engaged in significant natural 
resource extraction may be contrary to its purpose. In Angola the oil for infrastructure mechanism 
has dominated Sino-Angolan trade and relations. This does not seem to be the case in other 
comparable oil-rich countries where the use of this mechanism has so far been limited. The 
resource for infrastructure contracts seems to have been a small part of the Chinese engagement 
in Sudan and Congo-Brazzaville, and a failure in Nigeria. The resource for infrastructure 
mechanism, which is complicated to negotiate, seems to be country-specific with different factors 
at play. Therefore, drawing on comparable cases is crucial to gain a deeper understanding of the 
resources for infrastructure mechanism. More information is needed on the Chinese resources for 
infrastructure mechanism in other African countries to be able to make a thorough comparison of 
the mechanism. 
Main findings 
A main finding is that evidence indicates that the ‘Angola mode’ is not a mechanism to secure 
oil; rather it seem to be used to mitigate the risk of extending loans to a country with poor credit. 
While there seem to have been some initial linking between oil equity acquisitions by Chinese 
NOCs in the beginning, this was not publicly a part of the arrangement. The steady supply of oil 
is offered at market price, questioning the oil gains for China. Access to buy Angolan oil on the 
international market for market price is by no means limited. The credit-lines have facilitated 
access to Angola’s oil supply that is unnecessary to secure supply. While natural resources are by 
no means unimportant for China, the resources for infrastructure mechanism may not mainly be a 
method to secure a steady supply of oil in Angola. There seems to be little advantage to using a 
complicated mechanism to purchase oil at market rate. Unfortunately, there are still many 
unknowns about the resource for infrastructure mechanism. While this mechanism may not be 
aimed at securing resources, other actions by China and China’s companies certainly are. It may 
be misleading to present the resource for infrastructure mechanism as a method to secure China 
access to natural resources, but that does not suggest that access to natural resources are not 
important for China. It just indicates that in Angola, there are doubts as to whether the resources 
for infrastructure mechanism are used mainly for that purpose.    
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Contribution of the fieldwork 
A main finding from my fieldwork was that the export-credit offered to Angola was not used in 
full, and informants indicated that this was due to a lack of interest or capacity from the Angolan 
side for using all of the available credit. The Angolan government actively sought alternative 
sources of financing that was not as closely connected with promoting the exports of other 
countries. Internal changes in Angola such as the policy of diversification and the improvement 
of the economy seem to have made the Chinese resource for infrastructure contracts less 
important. This supported the notion that Angola is evolving from the oil-backed credits, and that 
the arrangement in 2004 was a moment in time rather than a model of Sino-Angolan engagement. 
Contribution of the thesis and suggestions for further research 
I have explored the usability of the two dominant perspectives on Sino-African engagement in 
analyzing the use of resources for infrastructure contracts in Angola. Both perspectives fail to 
pick up on important factors in this arrangement. Neither the Angolan government, nor the 
Nigerian government seems to have been passive players in these negotiations. This challenges 
the perception of the dependency/energy security perspective of the African states as passive 
participants. However, while African governments may be active players, this does not ensure 
that any pattern of resource extraction will be changed. While the local elites seem to have been 
active players, the resources for infrastructure mechanism is indeed an example of traditional 
patterns of natural resource extraction and import of value-added goods. There is an import of not 
only Chinese construction materials, but also of Chinese companies and workers. The 
dependency/energy security perspective needs to take into account that Chinese engagement in 
Africa go beyond natural resource extraction. While natural resources are by no means 
unimportant, the narrow focus on natural resources overlooks other important dimensions of 
Chinese engagement such as the implications of the establishment of Chinese companies and 
Chinese migrants in African countries. Explaining this presence with China’s hunt for natural 
resources limits the analysis. Likewise, the mutual benefit South-South perspective fails to 
capture pitfalls with the resources for infrastructure mechanism. While China was a developing 
country when it participated in a similar agreement with Japan, China had the capacity to exploit 
these opportunities. Time will show if African countries have the capacity to do the same. 
Evidence indicates that the lack of technological transfer and joint ventures may be a serious 
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impediment for Angola to benefit from this arrangement in the long run.     
 As ‘China in Africa’ is still a recent field and Sino-African relations are continuously 
evolving, there are many topics of these relations that have not yet been sufficiently covered in 
the literature. Unfortunately, lack of information is a serious impediment to a thorough reliable 
analysis. There is a need for more case studies in other resource for infrastructure countries to 
collect data that may serve as the basis for a quantitative analysis, or comparative qualitative 
analysis. A systematic comparison of all the countries that have engaged in resource for 
infrastructure contracts is necessary to establish how this mechanism works across different 
countries. It remains to be seen whether the result of China’s presence in Angola will be mutual 
benefit, or if China is just reinforcing established patterns. While it may be a classic relationship, 
it has the potential to be something more just as it was for China and Japan. The resources for 
infrastructure contracts do not seem to be a mechanism primarily to secure Chinese access to 
natural resources. How challenges related to technological transfer and local content are handled 
in the future are likely to be a key influence on whether Angola will actually experience long 
term mutual benefit from the resources for infrastructure contracts in the end.  
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Appendix A - Interview guide 
I used this interview guide as a basis for my interviews. I did not ask all of my informants all of 
the questions; they were modified depending on the informant and the time available. 
Questions concerning how the mechanism has developed since implementation 
- What do you know about the Chinese credit-lines 
- Has there been a change in the resources for infrastructure mechanism since 2004? 
- How has the Angolan policy of diversification affected Sino-Angolan relations 
- How has Angola’s financial situation affected Sino-Angolan relations 
- Are there any political consequences of China’s credit lines? 
Concerning mutual benefit 
- Do the resources for infrastructure contracts provide mutual gains? 
- Do you see China as a different development partner for Angola? 
- Is the 30 percent reserved for Angolan companies implemented? 
- How do the Chinese credit-lines differ from the other credit-lines extended to Angola? 
- How is China different than other external actors in Angola? 
- Has the credits facilitated oil supply for China? 
- Are the Chinese construction companies established in Angola 
- How is the quality of the Chinese construction? 
- Do you think that the Chinese construction will provide Angola with long-term benefits 
- Did the Angolan government play an active role in negotiations with China? 
 
Questions for countries that had extended export-credits to Angola 
- How are your export-credits different from China’s credit line? 
- Are there any political conditions attached to your credit-line? 
- Are your export-credits backed by oil/oil guarantee? 
- Were the credits previously backed by oil/oil guarantee 
- Are the credits being used to the extent expected? 
- How many local workers do you have employed on officially financed projects? 
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Appendix B -  List over informants 
Maria Teresa Gomes Mateus, Counselor for Economic Cooperation at the Portuguese Embassy in 
Luanda, 18/1 2011, Luanda, Angola 
Regina Santos, Economist at the Catholic University in Angola, 19/1 2011, Luanda, Angola. 
Manuel Alves de Rocha, Economist at the Catholic University in Angola, 28/1 2011, Luanda, 
Angola 
Manuel Sanchez Melero,  Economic and commercial console at the Spanish embassy in Luanda, 
24/1 2011, Luanda, Angola. 
Zé Alves Pereira, Economic and Commercial advisor at the EU delegation to Angola, 24/1 2011, 
Luanda, Angola. 
Sergio Calundungo, director at the Angolan civil society organization Adra, 26\1 2011, Luanda, 
Angola. 
Ana Maria Carvalho, Communications and External Affairs at the World Bank in Angola,  27\1 
2011, Luanda, Angola. 
Emilio Londa, Economist at the Catholic University in Angola, CEIC, 17/1 2011, Luanda, 
Angola. 
Source at the Angolan Ministry of Finance, 31/1 2011,      
  Luanda, Angola 
 
Edson Santiago, Secretary of the Brazilian Embassy in Luanda, 21/1 2011,   
 Luanda, Angola 
 
Randal Peterson, Mission director for USaid in Angola, 27/1 2011,   
 Luanda, Angola 
 
Ladonna S.Sales, Economic Officer at the US embassy in Luanda, 27\1 2011,  
 Luanda, Angola 
 
Deborah Brautigam, Researcher at American University in Washington, 13/5 2011,  
 Bergen, Norway 
 
